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1. Introduction 
 
“We cannot succeed without this comprehensive approach - it is simply not enough to chase and deter pirates, 
not enough to try and do development when there is no security, not enough to try and provide economic support 
without a stable government…”1 
 
The European Union (EU) aims to be an important security actor globally.2 One of the EU’s 
strengths in the field of providing security is the wide range of instruments that it can apply, 
ranging from effort to manage conflict situations, to providing aid in European missions.3 The 
capacity of this toolbox is exceptional in comparison with other international organizations. 
However, to make optimal use of this toolbox there is the need for ‘comprehensiveness’. 
 Since the 1990s the EU decided to take responsibility to promote peace and security 
in the international arena and therefore set up institutions and instruments to have the ability 
to prevent or act within crises. Due to the complexity and the rise of intra-state conflicts since 
the end of the Cold War, the concept of security slowly moved towards another paradigm. 
The traditional perspective on security was perceived as the absence of violent conflict or war. 
Because of this changing security environment an increased humanitarian perspective on 
security arose. To tackle such complex conflicts by solely military means was not sufficient 
anymore, as this would not incorporate broader human security needs. From a policy 
perspective, human security offered the opportunity to include non-military causes of 
instability onto the agenda and to integrate separate, but related policy areas (development, 
human rights, conflict resolution, etc).4 The EU started to rethink its foreign policy approach 
and decided that more focus should be on the coherence of policies and long-terms objectives 
like development, to address human security.      
 An important step towards becoming a security actor was the institutionalization of 
the EU through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) was established as the second pillar and in 1999 the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) became part of the CFSP. Pirozzi speaks of a process of ‘… gradual 
Europeanisation of the bilateral means of assistance and cooperation… ’5 and Smith of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European 
Commission, C. Ashton at an annual meeting of the heads of delegations on the 3rd of September 2012.  
2 J. Solana, A Secure Europe in a better world: the European Security Strategy, p.1. 
3 K. E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, p. 157 
4 N. Pirozzi, The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management, p. 5 
5 N. Pirozzi, EU Support to African Security Architecture: Funding and Training Components, p. 7. 
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‘Brusselization’.6 Both indicated a development towards the desire for common positions and 
joint actions within EU’s foreign policy. It would help to deal with conflicts on a coherent 
manner. In 2003, in order to give more direction to EU’s foreign policy, Solana wrote the 
European Security Strategy (ESS), which included the new concept of human security. The 
ESS reaffirmed a pro-active attitude towards peacekeeping, support for the multilateral 
framework of the United Nations (UN), the link between internal and external security and 
interrelated concepts as security and development. Security was acknowledged as a 
multidimensional concept and therefore the EU would strive for coherence in the use of its 
tools deriving from different pillars. The challenge, as was highlighted in the ESS, was to 
bring together EU’s different instruments and capabilities. Both military and civilian, and in 
the role they play in fragile states with the emphasis on the policies that link security and 
development.7 The coordination and integration of actions for crisis management among EU 
institutions would ensure an added value within crisis situations.    
 The Treaty of Lisbon that took effect in 2009 simplified the Union’s structure and re-
emphasized the need for coherence between the distinct portfolios of EU’s external actions 
and its policies. The posting of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, also functioning as the Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), would 
facilitate coordination and would unite EU’s diplomatic, economic and military capabilities in 
pursuit of more coherent policy.8 In addition, the External Action Service (EEAS) was 
established to support the HR/VP in his task of coordinating external policies and bridging 
the former pillar division. The Treaty was the impetus for a more inclusive, multilateral and 
coherent action of the EU, labeled as ‘the comprehensive approach’.    
 For years the comprehensive approach (CA) has been at the forefront of EU’s internal 
and public debates. EU’s efforts, such as institutional reforms in the Lisbon Treaty, press 
releases and statements show EU’s willingness to adopt a CA. However, there has been much 
criticism of the EU’s ability to act coherently in the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(the renaming of ESDP) in crisis management missions, such as in DR Congo or Bosnia 
Herzegovina.9 The debate about the ability of the EU to act coherently in security missions 
and whether those missions are effective is at the order of the day. To make optimal use of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 K. E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, p. 30 
7 B. van Ginkel, EU Governance of the Treat of Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, p. 343  
8 K. E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, p. 39. 
9 M. Drent, The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Security: a Culture of Co-ordination?, p. 5.  
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EU’s relative advantage as a security actor, it is necessary that the EU acts according to the 
comprehensive approach.10     
 
1.1. Research question 
The research concentrates on the comprehensiveness of the EU crisis management. It is 
examined whether the EU is using the CA effectively. With the term ‘effectively’ is meant 
whether the approach has successful outcomes. The criteria for success will be explained later 
in the thesis. The conflict in Mali is used as a case study to answer the research question. The 
research question of this master thesis is: ‘Did the European Union manage the Malian conflict with an 
effective comprehensive approach?’ In other words, did the EU have an integrated policy towards 
Mali with successful results? The following sub-questions are made, to answer the research 
question:  
a) What is a comprehensive approach and when is it effective? 
b) What is the EU’s comprehensive approach towards Mali? 
c) Were EU’s development, humanitarian, political and security policy successful and 
integrated?  
d) Do EU policies in Mali align with the principles of a comprehensive approach?  
e) Could we speak of an effective integrated policy? 
 
1.2.  Motivation  
The reason why this research question is chosen is explained in this section. Within the 
literature the focus is often on the conceptualization, implementation and institutional 
operational and strategic consequences of the CA. Analyses have been done on the EU’s 
institutional developments, whether these contribute to increased comprehensiveness. In 2013 
Smith argued from an institutional perspective in the article Institutionalizing the ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’ to EU Security that the EU made significant improvements since the establishment of 
the CSDP and enhanced its CA through lessons from experiences and ad hoc 
improvisations.11 Though, he believes completion of the CA is still in process. Others have 
pointed out the structural challenges for the implementation of the CA. For instance, in 
Introduction: A European Approach to Comprehensive Security Gebhard emphasizes the challenge of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibidem. 
11 M. E. Smith, Institutionalizing the “Comprehensive Approach” to EU Security, p. 41. 
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finding a strategic and institutional balance between the intergovernmental CFSP/CSDP and 
the more established supranational elements of EU external action.12 The requirements of the 
Lisbon Treaty intensified the debate on the implications for the operationalization of the CA. 
Pirozzi argues that the Treaty, at least at strategic level, enabled the construction of a 
collective purpose within EU’s crisis management. Others, such as Blockmans and 
Spernbauerm, argue that the EU copes with continuous obstacles regarding the institutional 
competences in EU policies to manage conflict situations. As long as EU’s external action is 
not legally merged, the CA will stay an idealist aspiration instead of a practical realization. 
Merket agrees in his article that the procedural divide between intergovernmental actions 
within the framework of the CFSP/CSDP and more long-term measures implemented by the 
European Commission and the member states in shared competences limits the potential for 
complementary action. After analyzing the planning mechanisms in EU crisis management 
Mattelaer confirms Merket’s observation that EU’s CA is not yet finalized.   
 The aim of the thesis is to contribute to the debate about the challenges and 
operational capabilities of EU’s CA. It is significant to evaluate EU’s operational capacities,  
as we cannot solely rely on what the EU says it does in the field of conflicts. The EU strives to 
have an added value within conflicts, which makes the question highly relevant. In addition, 
the outcome of the research could lead to recommendations for future conflict management 
scenarios and enhance EU’s global role as security actor.    
 The case of Mali is chosen because of its actuality. It is examined whether the 
institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty indeed make the EU a successful conflict manager 
by integrating and coordinating its policies. The EEAS was for long an institute in progress. 
Almost four years after its establishment, when the Mali crisis broke out, it could be expected 
that the institute is functioning effectively. Therefore an examination of EU activities in Mali, 
it’s comprehensiveness, is highly interested to say something about EEAS potential. Hence 
the focus on Mali is theoretically intriguing. 
1.3. Limitations 
The research is conducted in the form of a case-study. This is already a limitation in itself and 
indicates that we cannot provide a conclusion whether the EU uses the comprehensive 
approach effective in other cases of conflict. Therefore a lack of external validity is present.
 In addition, the research concentrates mainly on the effectiveness of the 
comprehensive approach. This refers to the consequences of EU strategy towards Mali and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 C. Gebhard, Introduction: A European Approach to Comprehensive Security, p. 5. 
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therefore to the operationalization of EU’s CA. This implies one condition is assumed for 
EU’s security governance in Mali, namely the presence of an effective internal functioning of 
the EU.  The internal structures of the EU are not assessed, only the operationalization of the 
comprehensive approach.  
1.4.  Research methods and outline  
The research is conducted from a positivist perspective, because the concept of the 
comprehensive approach is tested. Within this thesis qualitative research is done, in which 
various forms of data is used, such as primary and secondary sources, reports and an 
interview. The observation of the developments of the conflict contributes to the gathering of 
information.          
 Chapter two explores what is meant with the general concept of CA. This 
contextualization is fundamental because in the literature the term could have slightly 
different meanings. That is why the EU’s CA is specifically explained, together with when it is 
perceived as effective. The criteria are outlined for an effective CA that function as 
benchmarks for the results of the analysis. In this section primary and secondary literature are 
used. The statement of Woollard in 2013, the Executive Director of European Peacebuilding 
Liaison Office has been a useful source. Other scholars have contributed to the 
conceptualization of the CA, such as Pirozzi in 2013; Gross in 2008 and 2013; Gebhard and 
Norheim-Martinse in 2011; and, Smith in 2013, which has been valuable for this section of 
the thesis.      
Subsequently, in chapter three an in-depth analysis of the case of Mali is performed. 
First, the situation in Mali is briefly outlined through an explanation of the conflict. Secondly, 
the approach of the EU towards Mali is defined by a description of its strategy including its 
external policies towards the country. The use of primary sources, such as EU press releases, 
speeches, Council decisions, EU communications and other EU documents, is key for this.
 In the fourth chapter it is examined whether EU’s policies lead to successful results 
and its degree of integration. An examination of each policy separately and its effects is 
therefore essential. In addition, it is analyzed whether there are constraints and overlap in its 
policies. Also it is investigated whether there are contradictory outcomes between policies and 
the degree of integration. EU reports and communications are explored to conduct the 
analysis. Also developments that took place in Mali between 2012 until 2014 are surveyed by 
analyzing media sources. In addition, reports and evaluations of reliable organizations, 
S1453858 
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reports of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and EU’s Parliamentary documents are 
studied. An orientating conversation with M. Jongman, who was a civil servant at the 
Permanent Representation of the Netherlands in Brussels and participant of the Africa and 
African Caribbean and Pacific Council Working Groups within the Union during 2012 and 
2013, contributes to the analysis in this chapter. Also the interview with B. Soret, part of the 
EU delegation in Mali until 2013 and current team leader of the Mali/Sahel team of the 
EEAS in Brussels, provides valuable information.13 Thereupon conclusions can be drawn 
whether these policies are integrated in one strategy and whether they are positively aligned 
and successful.           
 In the fifth part of the thesis it is checked whether the actual principles of EU’s CA are 
included in EU’s approach towards Mali. What is done to shape EU policy, as explained in 
chapter three of the thesis, is compared with the principles of the CA to conclude about the 
ability of the EU to operationalize its policy comprehensively. That is, it is explored whether 
the policy towards Mali aligns with the principles of the CA, those that are discussed in 
chapter two. Additionally, EU documents and the interview are used.   
 In the last part a conclusion is provided whether the EU is capable to implement a CA 
in an effective manner in Mali. At last, recommendations are included. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Annex II – Interview Guide  
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2. What is the comprehensive approach? 
In this section a clear definition of the term comprehensive approach is explained. Firstly, a 
general definition of the concept is provided, followed by a paragraph that explains what the 
EU precisely means with the CA. At last, the third paragraph explains when the CA is 
considered effective.  
2.1.  The comprehensive approach in general 
After the Cold War international peacekeeping and peace-building operations to provide 
human security were challenged. It became evident that there was a need for better 
coherence and coordination, due to the increased complexity of conflicts, the increased need 
of cooperation and to realize sustainable solutions. The argument for coherence was 
strengthened by the evaluation of the civilian conflict of Rwanda. Here it was argued that the 
close relationship between the level of security and the effectiveness of humanitarian 
assistance highlights the need for coherence in the strategies adopted by the political/military 
and humanitarian domains.14 Hence, various actors started independently to survey different 
models and mechanisms to enhance the coherence, cooperation and coordination of conflict 
management. Therefore, as stated in 2008 in the DIIS Report The United Nations and the 
Comprehensive Approach, an explanation of the CA is the effort to pursue greater synergy, 
harmonization and complementarily in the international peace-building system.15 New 
systems were built up to provide human security by adopting a multidimensional approach. 
Examples of states having labeled the CA for crisis management are: Germany and the 
‘vernezetze Sicherheit’, The Netherlands and the ‘3D-approach’ and Great Britain with the 
‘whole of government’ approach. The House of Commons concluded on the basis of 
similarities in each approach that the CA is horizontal, including both civilian and military 
parties and, where possible, allies and international organizations and local nationals; and 
vertical, taking account of the different stages in the situations from the initial war fighting 
phase to reconstruction.16 Generally, the CA should be seen from a holistic perspective.    
2.2.  The EU comprehensive approach to external conflict  
The Lisbon Treaty stated that EU’s external policies should be consistent with each other and 
in alignment with other EU policies. The Treaty concerns, inter alia, EU’s external action 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 J. Erikson, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, p. 28. 
15 C. de Coning, The United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach, p.3. 
16 House of Commons, The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make better peace, p. 11. 
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and its amendments are based on the desire to be comprehensive within its policies. The 
Lisbon Treaty ensures a new institutional base for the realization of consistent, effective and 
strategic policies. Before the Lisbon Treaty the concept of the CA has been used already 
regularly within EU’s external action.17 Though, the concept was used ambiguously due to 
different interests of member states and EU institutions about the characteristics and the 
activities it should cover. In 2013 the concept of EU’s CA became more clear because of the 
Joint Communication of the HR/VP and the European Commission (EC): The EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis. This was expanded by the Council conclusions 
on the EU’s comprehensive approach in 2014.      
 On the basis of these documents and secondary literature the following principles 
underpinning EU’s CA are identified. The CA is placed in a broad framework covering ‘all’ 
EU external actions. Pirozza confirms that within this understanding the CA is perceived as a 
way to deal with not only matters within the CSDP, it includes all matters in EU’s external 
relations. Woollard refers to the encompassment of wider objectives and activities of the EU 
strategy in a ‘whole-of-EU approach’.18 Instruments included can range from diplomacy, 
security, defense, finance, trade, development, human rights, justice and migration. Woollard 
underlines that until now this objective of including all policies remains ideally because some 
external policies, such as trade policy, remains ‘untouchable’, despite provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty.19 The EU strives to use all the tools at the EU’s disposal (political, 
civilian/development, military) together in the field.20 Therefore one core principle of the CA 
is EU’s multidimensional approach.         
 These various EU instruments should be combined and used in a coherent manner. 
In 2001 this principle of coherence, in which tools should be combined well, was already 
recognized in the EC communication where it was stated that the Union should have the 
ability to react with the appropriate mix of instruments to specific circumstances.21 Military 
and civilian capabilities within the CSDP need to be coordinated complementary to EU’s 
financial, economic and development tools. The EU’s CA for crisis response and 
management includes civil-military coordination, as well as civil-civil coordination between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 European Commission, ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - The EU’s Comprehensive 
Approach to external conflict and crises’, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_03_en.pdf, consulted 
on 5 October 2014.  
18 C. Woollard, The EU and the Comprehensive Approach, p.1. 
19 Ibidem, p. 3.  
20 N. Pirozzi, The EUs Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management, p. 6 
21 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention’, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/crisis_management/docs/com2001_211_en.pdf, consulted on 1 October 2014. 
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CFSP and Commission competences.22 This also refers to its desire to integrate civilian and 
military principles in the field. Thus, cohesion is essential within the CA.   
 Within EU’s CA the principle of multilateralism is also included. Multilateralism 
means that countries, regional organizations and multilateral organizations work together in 
order to tackle the complexity of conflicts. This also means that EU policy should be 
reconciled with those of the member states and that the EU should cooperate with other 
(international and national) actors present.      
 Furthermore, the CA should ideally cover all stages of conflict or other external crisis 
in order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-term development.23 
All stages of the conflict-cycle includes also the initial phase of indicating signs of an emerging 
conflict and the phase in which the EU could be active to prevent a conflict.  
 Within the Joint Communication of the EC in 2013 the principle of the nexus 
between development and security is outlined. To accomplish the reduction of poverty and 
long-term development, a peaceful and secure environment is needed. This is also the other 
way around. To accomplish a peace and secure environment, there is the need of sustainable 
development and the reduction of poverty. Within the EU strategy this connection should be 
taken into account. The Commission refers also to other principles that underpin the 
connection between the two objectives of security and development: the context-based 
approach; the common and shared responsibility of all actors within the EU and the respect 
for the different competences within the EU structure.24      
 The last principle is the combination of short-term and long-term objectives. The EU 
should be able to rapidly react on crisis through being flexible, whilst also addressing long-
term objectives to build up sustainable solutions within fragile states. Short-term objectives 
should not undermine long-term objectives, as long-term objectives should not undermine 
short-term objectives. This principle relates to the nexus between development and security, 
as development objectives are mostly based on a long-term perspective and security objectives 
more on a short-term perspective.        
 Thus, derived from EU documents and secondary sources it can be concluded that 
EU’s CA rests on the following principles: a multidimensional approach, coherency, 
multilateralism, the focus on all stages of conflict, the nexus between security and 
development, and the combination of short- and long-term objectives. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 E. Gross, EU and the Comprehensive Approach, p. 11.  
23 European Council, ‘Council conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach’, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf, consulted on 18 October 2014 
24 Ibidem, p. 4.	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2.3. What is an effective comprehensive approach? 
To provide an adequate answer on the research question it is essential to define the meaning 
of an ‘effective’ CA. Based on the conceptualization of the CA by several scholars there are 
three criteria for a CA being effective. Particularly the theories of Pirozzi and Gross on the 
concept of a CA were essential for section.       
 One criterion for being comprehensive effectively is that the EU should adopt one 
collective EU strategy for the conflict, which means there is a single policy agenda or set of 
objectives to reach sustainable transformation in the conflict area. Subsequently, this implies 
that decisions are being made concerning priorities of policies and the allocation of resources. 
Preferably this is done by one authority and derived from a context-based analysis. Within the 
strategy an agreement on the division of labor and coordination of its dimensions is included. 
There should be a joint understanding on the challenges and how to address them on the 
short-, medium and long-term.       
 Secondly, the policies of the strategy need to be harmonized. Two of the principles of 
EU’s CA are a multidimensionality approach and coherence. Ideally, these principles should 
be combined through the full integration of EU’s instruments. This indicates that each policy 
could adequately deal with the activities of other policies in the strategy. Meaning there are 
no overlapping results, contradictory outcomes, or each policy did not undergo constraints 
caused by activities of other policies in the strategy. In the best possible way an effective CA 
includes policies that are fully integrated and positively affecting each other, which is enabled 
by policy coordination that is being streamlined institutionally. Actors cooperate for the same 
purpose and try to achieve one overall goal. They work jointly towards meeting the aims of 
the strategy. When actors avoid working at cross-purposes Mattalear speaks of ‘deconflict’.25 
When de-conflicting occurs, EU’s response to crisis remains compartmentalized, meaning 
that each policy is implemented by autonomous structures. In this case the CA is not entirely 
effective, because the EU should reconcile the principles of each policy by cross-sectorial 
work. Integration, coordination, cooperation and communication are important to have a 
harmonized strategy.          
 The last criterion of being effective is that each pillar of its strategy has successful 
outcomes. A successful outcome means that there is progress on the objectives within each 
pillar. This is in alignment with the definition used in the social research glossary, as it states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 A. Mattelaer, The Empty Promise of Comprehensive Planning in EU Crisis Management, p. 139. 
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that effectiveness is the extent to which an activity fulfills its intended purpose or function.26  
Progress is considered successful in this thesis when EU policy did not impede itself in 
fulfilling the objectives of its policy. In this way external influences are excluded in the 
analysis, which enables the ability to say something about the effectiveness of EU activities.
 Concluding, an effective strategy means that each pillar achieved progress on its 
objectives and was not being held or interrupted due to inefficiencies within EU’s own policy 
towards the country.  
2.4. Sub-conclusion 
To conclude, the concept of the CA generally refers to the efforts of actors to deliver human 
security through a complementary, harmonized and synergized use of instruments. This 
includes the cooperation among actors in the field and action during all stages of crisis. The 
EU’s CA consists of several principles, namely a multidimensional approach, coherency, 
multilateralism, the focus on all stages of conflict, the nexus between security and 
development and the combination of short- and long-term objectives. In order to make EU’s 
CA effective the EU should draft one collective strategy. It is necessary to harmonize the 
pillars of the strategy and each pillar should make progress without being impeded by own 
actions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Quality Research International, ‘Analytic Quality Glossary’, 
www.qualityresearchinternational.com/glossary/effectiveness.htm, consulted on 20th of October 2014.  
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3. What is EU’s comprehensive approach in Mali? 
This section aims to outline EU’s comprehensive approach towards Mali as it is suggested 
within EU documents. First, the conflict in Mali is explained. Then the EU strategy towards 
Mali as response to the crisis is outlined, in which the different pillars are being analyzed. At 
last, conclusions are drawn on EU’s policy in Mali. 
3.1. The conflict  
Before the outbreak of the crisis in Mali in 2012, Europeans regarded the state as a 
democratic example in West Africa, which was known as a turbulent region with many 
civilian wars.27 The perspective on Mali changed drastically from an example state into a 
failed state.          
 The conflict in Mali is very complex, because many actors are involved and various 
processes are happening simultaneously. The first attacks of the secessionist Tuareg rebels 
who are fighting for an independent state of Azawad in January 2012, remark the beginning 
of the crisis. The Malian army kept the President Touré responsible for their incapacity to 
provide a capable and efficient counterinsurgency. In addition, the government was accused 
of its inability to address political, governance, security and socio-development challenges. 
This led eventually to the deposing of the President by a military coup on the 22nd of March.
 The coup d’état increased political and constitutional instability. The Tuareg rebels 
(the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, MNLA) took advantage to get control 
of large parts of northern Mali. Furthermore terrorist Islamist groups were fighting in this 
region and through cooperation the Tuaregs declared an independent state of Azawad in 
April 2012. In the meanwhile the military junta handed over its power to a civilian interim 
government under President Traoré.        
 Political instability made the alliance of Tuareg rebels and Islamist jihadists able to 
take control of the main cities Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. The jihadists received support from 
terrorists coming from the entire Sahel region, which made them capable to declare northern 
Mali as an independent Islamic state with sharia law in May 2012. The alliance of Tuaregs 
(not fighting for an Islamic state) and Jihadists then felt apart and the Tuaregs were displaced 
from the north.         
 Military forces were dissatisfied with President Traoré. This led to the installment of a 
new transitional government of national unity headed by Prime Minister Cheick Modibo 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 D.J. Francis, The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in Mali, p. 4. 
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Diarra in August 2012. However, already in December he was forced to resign by the 
military. The Islamic Jihadists were controlling the entire northern region and heading 
towards the southwestern region. Their move to capture Bamako finally shook up the 
international community. From November 2012 the Malian crisis was been put on the 
international agenda that led to several interventions and missions. The French intervened 
through Operation Serval to support the Malian army. The African-led international Support 
Mission to Mali (AFISMA) also stood by in January 2013. On the first of July 2013 the 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) took over 
from AFISMA. EU’s reaction will be discussed in the next section of the chapter. 
3.2. The EU’s policy towards Mali 
The Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel 
To understand EU’s engagement in Mali it is essential to explain thoroughly the EU’s 
strategy for the Sahel region first. The Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel was 
launched in March 2011 to address regional challenges, such as food insecurity, corruption, 
terrorism, fragile governance and underdevelopment. The EU believes that only a regional, 
integrated and holistic strategy is suitable to solve these problems because they cross borders 
and are interrelated.28 The implementation of the strategy started in three countries: Mali, 
Mauritania and Niger. The EU builds on and supports existing national, regional or 
international initiatives, promotes regional cooperation and stimulates capacity building of 
governments. The strategy is based on the priority of reinforcing development and security 
within the region. Within the framework four complementary dimensions exist: 
1) Development, good governance and internal conflict resolution 
2) Political and diplomatic 
3) Security and the rule of law 
4) Fight against and prevention of violent extremism and radicalization 
 
Between 2007 and 2013 the three focus countries received 1.5 billion euros under the 10th 
European Development Fund (EDF) for matters as good governance, rule of law, justice, 
decentralization process, agriculture and rural development, social sectors, the Millennium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 EEAS, ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’, http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf, 
consulted on 28th of September 2014.  
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Development Goals, economic development and infrastructure.29 The EDF is a fund of the 
Cotonou agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
that focuses on development goals. Since 2014 the 10th EDF was succeeded by the 11th EDF 
of which Mali receives support. As response to the crisis extra money was mobilized for the 
region for humanitarian and development matters.      
 Hence, Mali receives through the Sahel Strategy additional support. The Strategy is a 
framework for action on a regional- but also a national scale and has the priority to address 
developmental and security challenges.      
The creation of a crisis response strategy 
To ensure an adequate crisis response the EU strived for collective action. After the initiation 
of Operation Serval the EU decided to establish an EEAS Crisis Platform to outline the 
possible response options. This platform functions to bring different services across the EU 
structures together and can be established immediately. It is regarded as crucial for providing 
a comprehensive and decisive response to external crisis.30 The EU Military Committee,  
EU’s structure for crisis response and management, and relevant services from the European 
Commission came together to form a plan for Mali. On the 17th of January 2013 an 
extraordinary meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council took place to discuss the response 
package and to directly adopt action. The EEAS Crisis Response and Operational 
Coordination department finished the options paper, which was approved in a second 
meeting of the Crisis Platform. The options were presented to the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) and the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department 
established an inter-service mission on the 28th of January in Bamako. This mission brought 
all relevant actors together to conduct a needs-assessment to evaluate and decide on short-, 
medium- and long-term measures for new programs in Mali.31 On the base of these processes 
a strategy for Mali was being generated. 
The policies under the strategy for Mali 
The EU has various tools that can be mobilized in its approach for the management of crisis. 
The described pillars are based on the mandate for foreign action derived from the EU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 EEAS, ‘Factsheet - The European Union and the Sahel’, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140206_01_en.pdf, 
consulted on 29th of September 2014. 
30 EEAS, ‘Crisis Platform’, http://eeas.europa.eu/crisis-response/what-we-do/crisis-platform/index_en.htm, consulted on 
1st of October 2014. 
31 EEAS, ‘Sahel Crisis Response’, http://eeas.europa.eu/crisis-response/where-we-work/sahel/index_en.htm, consulted on 
1st of October 2014. 
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Foreign Affairs Council meeting on the 17th of January.32 The Council Conclusions of 
January 17th gave the legitimacy for the EU to act immediately. The Council stated: “…in 
line with the UNSC resolutions (in particular resolution 2071 and 2085) the EU supports the efforts being 
made by the region and by the international community.”33 UNSC Resolution 2071 affirmed the 
preparedness to consider requests for an international military force. It also encouraged the 
international community to provide support for a solution of the crisis, referring to 
humanitarian, security and development matters. Additionally, it asked the AU and EU for 
supporting the Malian forces with capacity-building resources, expertise and training. UNSC 
Resolution 2085 recalled the international community to provide support for a resolution of 
the conflict. It emphasized the needed support for AFISMA and requested the EU to help 
AFISMA in strengthening the Malian security and defense forces by providing coordinated 
assistance, expertise and trainings that include courses on human rights and international 
humanitarian law.34 Thus, the EU foreign affairs ministers made decisions in accordance with 
the UNSC Resolutions. The Council conclusions ensured the establishment of the EU crisis 
response strategy for Mali, which is active in four areas: humanitarian aid, development aid, 
political support and security. Each policy will shortly be explained in the next section.  
Humanitarian Aid    
The European Commission is responsible for the portfolio of Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection (ECHO). It provides aid directly and indirectly by supporting NGO’s and other 
(international) organizations that provide humanitarian assistance on the base of the 
fundamental humanitarian principles outlined in the European Consensus on Humanitarian 
Aid and international humanitarian law: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and 
independence. The EU’s mandate for humanitarian action is stated in the Council 
conclusions: “The EU is prepared to step up its support immediately for the efforts being made by 
humanitarian originations to assist people in need…”35     
 From 2012 to 2014 the EC has mobilized 178 million euros for providing relief to the 
vulnerable people in Mali, particularly in the northern region that faces food-insecurity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Annex II – Council Conclusions on Mali 
33 European Council, ‘Council Conclusion on Mali’, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134144.pdf, consulted on 2nd of January 
2015. 
34 UNSC, ‘Resolution 2085’ http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085(2012), consulted on 
28th of Janauary 2015. 
35 European Council, ‘Council Conclusion on Mali’, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134144.pdf, consulted on 2nd of January 
2015. 
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malnutrition and an instable environment.36 The support takes many forms, but is directed to 
reach as many conflict-affected people possible in the country to provide their humanitarian 
needs. Because of the regional food crisis, one priority is to provide food security.  
 Thus, the main goal of ECHO is to provide humanitarian needs to the vulnerable 
people. Therefore it is most active in the northern region of the country where the fighting 
continues.  
Development Assistance 
Another portfolio of the Commission is Development and Cooperation. The EU is the biggest 
donor of development aid for Mali. Mali receives development funds from the 10th and 11th 
EDF, which is covered under the Sahel Strategy. The decision to resume development 
cooperation and to rapidly disburse development funds is also outlined in the Council 
conclusions of the extra-ordinary foreign affairs council meeting.37 As response to the crisis, 
the development programs are put in line with the Sustainable Recovery Plan of Mali to 
support immediate humanitarian needs, restore basic services, stabilize the country, restore 
public administration and rule of law, and contribute to resume conditions for long-term 
development.38           
 In addition, through the organization of a donor conference ‘Together for a New 
Mali’ by the President of the EC Barosso, the French President Hollande and the Malian 
President Traoré, 3.25 billion euros was gathered, of which the EU mobilized 5.23 million 
euros. The EC and the European member states are responsible for one third of the total 
amount of pledges. Part of the development funds is the state-building contract (SBC), signed 
by the EC and the Malian government, in which 225 million euros goes directly to the 
government in case political progress is made by the Malian authorities. Aim is to cover the 
most immediate needs such as police, security, justice as well as the resumption of basic public 
services.39           
 The developmental funds are directed to several areas: politics, security, humanitarian 
needs and to turn humanitarian aid into developmental projects. Through the African Peace 
Facility (APF), also part of the EDF, 50 million euros are mobilized to support AFISMA. 
Within the analysis of chapter 4 only the development objectives will be analyzed under the 
pillar of development aid. Development funds for other objectives will be discussed in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 European Commission, ‘EU increases its humanitarian aid for Mali’, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/news/eu-increases-its-
humanitarian-aid-mali, consulted on 3rd of October 2014. 
37 Annex II – Council Conclusions on Mali 
38 European Commission, ‘Mali’, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/mali_en, consulted on 5th of October 2014. 
39 C.V. Rasmussen, Linking instruments in development and foreign policy, P. 22. 
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suitable pillars to which it is directed.        
 Accordingly, the developmental objectives are mainly to provide basic services, to 
support humanitarian needs and to stabilize the country through support for the rule of law 
and public administration. This should help the country to resume long-term development 
projects.  
Political transition 
The political dimension of EU’s strategy is its support for political transition as decided in the 
Council conclusions of the foreign affairs council meeting.40 It stated that political progress is 
essential in order to ensure Mali’s long-term stability and therefore the EU received the 
mandate to politically put pressure on the Malian authorities and support the political 
progress through development funds. The EEAS mobilized through the Instrument for 
Stability (IfS) 20 million euros, part of the development funds, for a stabilization support 
package. This provides assistance for the organization of free and democratic presidential 
elections, promotes the National Dialogue, reconciliation, democracy, human rights and a 
fair justice program. The EU is also an important co-mediator in the peace process led by 
Algeria.         
 Furthermore, the EU engages with the Malian government through political dialogue 
under the Cotonou agreement to promote EU’s values and defend its fundamental interests. 
It has the opportunity to encourage political dialogue at many levels including high-level 
mediation.41 The Council, Commission, EEAS, the Mali delegation and the EU special 
representative of the Sahel play a role within maintaining the political dialogue.   
 In addition, the funds under the SBC, part of the development funds, are provided for 
certain political benchmarks that show government’s progress on restoring services, 
governance, justice, organizing elections, anti-corruption and political resolution. It is paid in 
three installments over 2013 and 2014.42 Through this mechanism the EU can make the use 
of sanctions in case political objectives are not achieved. Part of the SBC funds is supporting 
political objectives, such as restoring democracy, the rule of law and strengthen governance. 
Budget support under the SBC is used to be a lever for technocratic reform and democratic 
governance reform.43         
 Summarized, the political dimension supports political transformation in the country 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Annex II – Council Conclusions  on Mali 
41 C.V. Rasmussen, Linking instruments in development and foreign policy, P. 18 
42 European Commission, ‘Press Release’ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-599_en.htm, consulted on 10 
October 2014.  
43 G. Galeazzi, V. Hauck, J. van Heulekom, The EU’s State Building Contracts, p.12. 
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by means of the stability instrument, political dialogue and the possibility of sanctions under 
the SBC. 
 
Security   
      
Lastly, the EU is involved in the area of security. It welcomed the intervention of France and 
supported, likewise through the APF, the deployment of AFISMA by the African Union (AU) 
and MINUSMA by the United Nations (UN), which is decided in the Council conclusions of 
the 17th of January 2013 and in line with the UNSC resolutions.      
 It assists national or regional efforts for security sector reformations through the 
establishment of the European Training Mission (EUTM) in February 2013, which is 
legitimatized under UNSC Resolution 2085. In addition, the mission should rebuild the 
Malian armed forces and meet their operational needs by providing expertise, advice and 
trainings to the combat units.44         
 On top of this, in April 2014 the civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Mali was launched to 
support Mali’s internal security forces and to allow the Malian authorities to restore and 
maintain constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace in Mali. 
Moreover, it supports the effective redeployment of national administration to restore and 
maintain state authority and legitimacy throughout the territory of Mali.45   
 In conclusion, under the security pillar the EU provides support for AFISMA and 
MINUSMA and trains the Malian army under the EUTM and internal security forces under 
the EUCAP Sahel.    
 
3.3. Sub-conclusion 
After analyzing the response of the EU on the crisis of Mali, it can be concluded that the EU 
mobilized a strategy based on four pillars. The EU is active in the humanitarian and 
development fields, it provides political support and it assists Mali in security objectives. 
ECHO provides humanitarian needs to the conflict affected people. The Commission is 
active within the portfolio of Development and Cooperation, in which it supports Mali in 
providing basic services, provides an answer on the humanitarian needs of the Malian people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 EEAS, ‘EU training Mission in Mali’, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-
mali/pdf/factsheet_eutm_mali_en.pdf, consulted on the 20th of October 2014. 
45 European Council, ‘Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Mali’, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_2014_113_R_0004&from=EN, consulted on 25th of October 
2014.	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and promotes stabilization. It aims to turn short-term development objectives into long-term 
development objectives as soon as possible. Within the political pillar it strives for political 
transformation and reconciliation. The EU tries to achieve security through its support for 
AFISMA and MINUSMA, and the establishment of EUTM and EUCAP Sahel.  
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4.  Were EU’s development, humanitarian, politics and security policy 
successful and integrated? 
An effective comprehensive approach signifies that there is one overall EU strategy, EU 
policies are being harmonized and that it has successful outcomes. In this section the focus is 
on the degree of integration of the pillars of EU’s policy towards Mali and the successes of 
each pillar. In chapter 2.3 is explained that the four pillars of development, humanitarian 
assistance, politics and security are integrated in case they are not compartmentalized, they 
work for the same purpose and are positively aligned with each other. A policy is considered 
successful when the intended progress of strategy towards Mali has been made and not being 
withheld by inadequacies of the Union itself. In this chapter, first the successes of each pillar 
are being discussed followed by the degree of integration. This is done by analyzing sources, 
such as EU statements, the Dutch progress report on Mali, EU parliamentary questions, 
media sources and reports of EU’s partner organizations. An orientation conversation with 
M. Jongman and the interview with B. Soret have contributed to the analysis.  
4.1.  Political support  
The EU supports the political transformation in the country. In this paragraph the degree of 
success of EU’s support for political objectives is reviewed. The EU provides financial support 
for the reforming governance and justice. It also supports democratic elections and the 
political resolution of the crisis through political dialogue. The SBC is established to function 
as incentive for the Malian government to operate on political progress, as this contributes to 
direct budget support. Part of this budget should enable the government to politically reform 
and to establish basic services.  
Indicators for political success  
The Transitional Roadmap 
The EU initially condemned the coupe d’état and called for political transformation. It 
became clear the EU is of the opinion that a reliable and legitimate government is a condition 
for development cooperation, because this was put on hold. The EU regularly called the 
interim government to submit a credible and consensual roadmap as soon as possible. As a 
consequence of putting halt on development cooperation, it had put pressure on the interim 
government to work on political progress, which resulted in the adoption of the Transitional 
Roadmap. The adoption of the Transitional Roadmap, including planned elections, was seen 
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as an effort to return to constitutional order and made the EU decide to re-start development 
cooperation in February 2013.  
Political efforts for reconciliation, government reforms, democracy, justice and anti-corruption 
The Ouagadougou accords of June 2013, signed by the interim government and two Tuareg 
groups, is seen as an indicator of political progress for reconciliation. The renewal of 
institutions and the organization of free and fair elections in the summer of 2013 were also 
considered as important. B. Soret is of the opinion that democracy has been restored.46 The 
elected President Keita regularly emphasized his desire to deepen dialogue with the rebels, 
which demonstrated the government’s willingness for reconciliation.47 He also established the 
Commission for Reconciliation, Truth and Justice and the Malian parliament adopted an 
anti-corruption law. The initiated judicial investigations and hearings were also perceived as 
important steps against impunity.48   
Deficiencies of political progress  
Reconciliation  
Certain critical findings undermine this perception of political progress. The Ouagadougou 
accords between the interim government and two Tuareg groups seemed in first instance as 
an accomplishment within the progress for reconciliation. It is an agreement about ceasefire 
and the start of negotiations sixty days after successful national presidential elections. Though, 
it does not present details on how to achieve described goals like reconciliation.49 It does not 
have real vigor as it solely defines an agreement on future dialogue. The implementation of 
the agreement eventually failed. The deadline of initiating peace talks was expired and 
eventually the few negotiations that that took place were informal. Even in October 2014 the 
UNSC defined the implementation of the Ouagadougou accords and the advancement of 
political progress as key challenges.50 The government was not prepared to do a lot of 
concessions; it merely proposed conditions to participate in negotiations.51 It did organize two 
main dialogue conferences, but international NGO’s raised questions about whether those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46  Interview conducted with B. Soret, former member EU delegation Mali and current head of Mali/Sahel desk, EEAS, 
Brussels, on the 16th of January 2015. 
47 T. Koepf, Stuck in the desert: negotiations on northern Mali, p. 1.  
48 Secretary General UN, Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Mali in June 2014, p. 17 
49 B. Whitehouse, ‘Accord and discord in Mali’, http://bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/06/19/accord-and-discord-in-mali/, 
consulted on 28 September 2014. 
50 UN Security Council, ‘October 2014 Monthly Forecast’, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-
10/mali_14.php, consulted on 1 November 2014. 
51 T. Timmermans (ed), Progress report MINUSMA  including general developments May 2014, p.2.   
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were genuine and inclusive forums.52 Even the International Crisis Group (ICG) stated in 
January 2014: “It is time for this government to act beyond declarations of intent.”53 President Keïta had 
the responsibility of the progress towards an accord about the northern region and of 
institutional reforms. However, the government adopted a military approach in dealing with 
the crisis by increasing its armed presence in the north, instead of making real efforts for a 
political solution.54 Whilst the UN previously had insisted on government’s rapprochement 
with the Tuaregs,55 the government chose to confront the northern rebel groups. This 
culminated into a massive defeat of the Malian army that was sent by the government to 
Kidal in May 2014. The UN would not have to make a call for rapprochement in case the 
government had made real and sufficient efforts to seek consensus. After the incident of 
Kidal, the UN also questioned the measures undertaken to realize inclusive talks.56 Even B. 
Soret argued in the interview that the government not really tries to find a solution and is not 
willing to make any concessions.57 These facts show that the Malian government is not eager 
to find consensus about the northern region. 
Providing basic services  
Neither the government has invested sufficiently in providing basic services to the northern 
region. To achieve this goal the establishment of a decentralization strategy is vital. The local 
elections of April 2014 were extended, also because the government did not yet finalize a 
decentralization strategy.58 This indicates a slow political progress. In April 2014 ECHO 
confirmed that many people who need care in the north are not yet receiving it. According to 
Barbier, EU representative of ECHO, this is due to the lack of investments of Malian health 
authorities “to pick up the torch and invest more in prevention of malnutrition while confronting its causes”.59 
In addition, there was an overdue transfer of state resources to local authorities, which neither 
helped to provide the needed services.60 Apparently, the government does not set this 
objective as one of the highest priority. Civil servants are unwilling to return to the northern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 UN SC, ‘January 2014 Monthly Forecast’, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-
01/mali_11.php?print=true, consulted on 20 October 2014. 
53 ICG, Mali: Reform or Relapse- Africa Report N.210, p.1. 
54 T. Timmermans (ed), Progress report MINUSMA, including general developments in Mali October 2014, p.2. 
55 NRC Handelsblad, ‘Toeareg-rebellen verslaan leger in Noord-Mali’, 
http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/van/2014/mei/22/herovering-kidal-toeareg-rebellen-verslaan-leger-i-1382469, consulted 
on 20 October 2014.  
56 SG UN, Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Mali in June 2014, p. 17 
57 Interview conducted with B. Soret, former member EU delegation Mali and current head of Mali/Sahel desk, EEAS, 
Brussels, on the 16th of January 2015. 
58 T. Timmermans (ed), Progress report MINUSMA  including general developments May 2014, p.3.   
59 ECHO and UNICEF, ‘ECHO and UNICEF join forces to address the food crisis in Mali’, 
http://www.unicef.org/eu/files/ECHO_Nutrition_2014_UNICEF_Press_Release_EN_v11_FINAL.pdf, consulted on 1st of 
October 2014. 
60 ICG, Mali: Reform or Relapse- Africa Report N.210, p.2. 
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region, which also negatively impacts the restart of public services and the improvement of 
access to basic social services. As a result of these shortcomings the population has little 
confidence in the government. Until now the government fails to address one of the main 
priorities.  
Anti-corruption  
Moreover, according to the Dutch Ministry of Trade and Development the integrity of the 
anti-corruption initiatives and efforts to make governance budget more transparent are 
doubtful.61 Reasons are fiscal scandals, such as the purchasing of a government airplane 
outside the government budget and its investment in equipment for the Malian army without 
correct application of procurement. The report of the Justice Needs and Satisfaction survey in 
2014 concluded that there is still a lack of transparency of procedures and limited access to 
legal information, which contribute to the population’s distrust in the governmental 
institutions.62 In case the government would fully surrender to the political transition there 
would be no reason to doubt the transparency and anti-corruption initiatives. B. Soret was 
also of the opinion that there is a lack of political progress. He declared that the government 
is extremely slow in progressing and in fighting corruption.63 
Justice 
Institutional there are no significant reforms visible in the area of human rights. Whereas the 
Ministry of Justice claims its responsibility for human rights, it does not include a structure to 
realize this.64 In addition, the Commission of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation falls under the 
Ministry of Reconciliation, which makes it not completely neutral. Both are facts that could 
have been addressed by the government and thereby it would have shown its goodwill. 
Additionally, B. Soret pointed out that things are moving slow in terms of governance reform. 
The government is not responding to the commitments made and therefore Soret called the 
progress made disappointing.65 
Political dialogue  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 E. M. J. Ploumen, Aid, Trade and Investments - Letter of the Dutch Minister of Trade and development, p. 2. 
62 HiiL Innovating Justice, Report of the Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey, p.100. 
63 Interview conducted with B. Soret, former member EU delegation Mali and current head of Mali/Sahel desk, EEAS, 
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Although the EU is trying to continue political dialogue, it is noteworthy that during the EU-
AU April 2014 summit Mali finally was not being discussed. Other conflicts, such as the crisis 
in Central African Republic, were perceived as more important.66 This reflects a short-term 
perspective, while building up fragile states should be based on long-term engagement. 
Especially the Kidal confrontation in May 2014, just one month later, proofed a solution was 
still not nearby and a long engagement is needed.   
Sub-conclusion: political successes  
An evaluation of EU support for political transition resulted in some targets that have been 
met, but still deficits remain. What still lacks is good governance. The outcomes of the 
findings designate a rather slow political transformation, which undermines the efficiency of 
EU’s efforts for political progress. In addition, the EU needs to stay fully engaged with the 
political process in Mali because the solution is still not in sight. Hence, regarding the political 
pillar, the EU was not entirely efficient. It could have used the SBC as a better leverage. The 
EU therefore impeded its own objectives. The SBC was not used in a proper manner, as 
relevant deficiencies still remain within the political progress of Mali and could have been 
partly prevented by adopting a firmer approach. Furthermore, the political pressure it gave 
various times within its dialogue and statements did neither have real impact on the 
government. Thus, the EU did not fulfill completely its intended purpose and therefore we 
speak of moderate political success. 
4.2. Humanitarian support 
The EC mobilized 178 million euros for emergency relief for the conflict-affected people. EU 
member states allocated a significant amount of 120.6 million euros. These funds were 
directed for ECHO’s partner organizations to tackle the food crisis, protection, seasonal safety 
net programs, education and access to free and quality health care for people in the conflicted 
areas.   
Indicators of humanitarian progress  
Effective funding  
The EU had a rapid and considerable humanitarian response after the initiation of the 
conflict, whereby the focus on development projects transferred into emergency assistance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Orientation conversation with M. Jongman, former employee at the Permanent Representation of the Netherland to 
Brussels and participant of the Africa and ACP Council Working groups within the EU, on the 31st of October 2014. 
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This positively influenced its objective to reach many conflict-affected people. It accomplished 
to reach many people and address their basic needs. It increased its funding several times to 
cope with the food crisis. It treated 120.000 children in 2013 that were dealing with acute 
malnutrition, twice as many compared to 2012.67 Funds subsidized for example the 
functioning of health centers in the north by ECHO’s partner organizations. It continued to 
reinforce health structures, which ensured basic health and nutrition care to 800.000 people.  
In addition, it supported UNICEF in its Back to School campaign, which enabled the return 
of pupils to schools. 
Coordination of humanitarian action 
ECHO also supported coordination of humanitarian action in Mali. It worked with different 
kind of actors, such as other (international) organizations, the government and NGO’s to 
ensure an adequate and effective response to address the humanitarian needs of the country. 
It provided assistance to an initiative of the government, the World Food Programme and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, which targeted 2.1 million people who needed 
support during the lean season of 2014.68 Another example that enhanced coordination was 
its role in the founding of AGIR, which is a global alliance for strengthening the resilience of 
the poorest families.  
Effective response of ECHO’s partner organizations 
ECHO worked with partner organizations that responded efficient to abrupt crisis. This 
became evident after the incident of Kidal, when they were able to reorganize to ensure 
community health centers could continue to operate. This ensured that ECHO’s funds 
eventually helped many affected people immediate.  
Accessibility  
After two years, access for humanitarian actors in the north still is limited. The situation in 
northern Mali is still volatile and erupts occasionally. Insecurity is a huge obstacle for 
humanitarian organizations to provide support. Armed groups are not applying and 
respecting humanitarian principles, which is endangering humanitarian actors activities. 
Many people have fled from north to south due to food insecurity, precarious economic 
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68 Ibidem. 
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conditions, lack of basic services and violence in the north.69 The lack of accessibility has an 
effect on the amount of humanitarian assistance that is given and its quality. However, this is 
not attributable to ECHO that tries to tackle the difficult circumstances. To reach as many 
people as possible ECHO is supporting interventions by humanitarian organizations that are 
having the biggest chance of having access through their negotiations with armed groups and 
support from local communities.70 This enhances the ability of ECHO to reach many affected 
people. 
Deficiencies of humanitarian progress 
No real deficiencies of EU efforts to provide humanitarian assistance could be found. External 
factors have an impact on the capacity and ability of ECHO to reach the most vulnerable in 
the country. This fact is no internal obstacle in achieving humanitarian objectives and 
therefore it could not be mentioned as a deficit.     
Sub-conclusion: humanitarian successes  
ECHO reaches a lot of people since it coordinates humanitarian support with other actors in 
the field; it works with organizations that have the biggest chance of access to conflict-affected 
areas; and the EU is willing to step up its humanitarian support when necessary. Therefore its 
activities could be evaluated as successful, because ECHO does not undergo constraints 
within EU’s humanitarian policy that negatively affect its reach. However, it could have had 
more impact when external factors were more favorable, because until now ECHO faces a 
complex situation in the northern region due to the continuation of fighting, no respect for 
humanitarian principles by other actors and the limited access to the conflict areas. This 
makes it difficult to provide adequate assistance. Overall, the findings indicate successful 
outcomes in the area of humanitarian policy.  
4.3. Security support  
In this paragraph the degree of successes of the security policy is reviewed. The EU supported 
the interventions of France, the AU and the UN. Itself provided support for reforming the 
Malian security sector and to enhance Malian forces through the deployment of EUTM Mali 
and EUCAP Sahel Mali. As explained, until today the insecurity in the north remains highly 
problematic caused by armed terrorist groups that continue to operate. In this area the 
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70 C. Ashton, Answer of HR/VP Ashton on behalf of the Commission on written question of the EP,  E-009360/12.  
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circumstances only worsened, especially due to the Kidal incident of May 2014.  In contrast, 
the south is considered stabile compared with the north region.  
Indicators for security progress 
Capacity building 
The EUTM would have to enhance the capacities of the Malian army. The army should be 
rebuild and being met with their operational needs, so it would be able to conduct high 
intense combats. The current insecurity in the north could not only be attributed to the EU. 
The EUTM has improved the capacities of the Malian army to some degree, because most of 
them started at level zero within their trainings.71 
Security Sector Reform 
Within the mission advice is given to the Malian Ministry of Defense and Malian 
headquarters. This enabled the Malian authorities to lay the first foundation for strategic level 
reformations. It also decided to establish EUCAP Sahel Mali, which is an additional 
contribution to EU’s overall support to institutionally reform and to fully restore the state 
authority throughout the country.72  
Regional approach 
The EU also recognizes that to fight terrorism a regional approach is needed, since the threat 
crosses borders. Therefore EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali are closely coordinating 
with other regional EU missions, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUBAM Libya, which are all 
falling under the Sahel Strategy. 
Deficiencies of security progress 
Expectation-gap 
The initial mandate of 15 months, in which four battle groups each obtained ten weeks of 
training, would never be sufficient to combat high intense fighting by the Malian army.73 The 
French realized that EUTM graduates would not be able to deal with the terrorists without 
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72 European Council, ‘EUCAP Sahel Mali: EU Support mission for internal security in Mali established’, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142239.pdf, consulted on 15th of October 2014. 
73 C.H. Wiklund and E.Skeppström, Memo of Peace Operation Project - European Union Training Mission Mali – 
Challenges and Opportunities, p.1.   
S1453858 
	  
29	  
support of the international community and decided to keep French forces longer than 
planned in the battlefield. Eventually, this was the reason why the mandate of the EUTM 
Mali was extended.  
Capacities 
As mentioned the capacities of the Malian army have improved, nevertheless the degree of 
improvements appear to be very low. Within the mandate of the mission this is not the 
intention. In May 2014 the ‘incident of Kidal’ demonstrates the lack of adequate capacity of 
the Malian army. Trained battle groups by the EUTM were involved in this incident. The 
‘incident of Kidal’ points out the situation in which the Malian army was surprised by the size 
of their opponents and the strength of their weapons. The Malian army decided to flee and 
leave their weapons and munitions behind, which finally came into the hands of the 
rebellions. The army of the government underwent a major overthrow and embarrassment. 
The lack of quality is confirmed by the government that declared that Malian soldiers were 
forced ‘to retreat under heavy fire’ after problems with ‘coordination and intelligence’.74 The 
government did not inform the French or MINUSMA beforehand about its move towards 
Kidal, which proves a lack of coordination in the security sector. Similarly the attack of 
extremists on a town in the middle of Mali on the 5th of January 2015 demonstrates the lack 
of capacities of the Malian army. Two Malian soldiers died and the rest fled away.75 These 
occurrences showed that after two years the Malian army still is not capable to provide 
sufficient form of resistance.  
Breaching humanitarian principles      
The EUTM includes modules on international humanitarian law (IHL) and humanitarian 
principles. A reason to question the successes of the EUTM is the breaching of humanitarian 
principles. In November 2013 the army fired on civilian protesters against the visit of the 
Prime Minister to Kidal.76 This incident questions the meaning of the modules in the 
trainings, as the protection of the civilians is a cornerstone of IHL.77 The Malian army as well 
breached humanitarian principles in June 2013 by not allowing medical emergencies during 
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curfew.78 This was in the same month when the first trained battalion was being deployed in 
this area.79 Furthermore, the Malian army continuously enters hospitals. This is not in line 
with humanitarian principles, as hospitals need to be safe and neutral places. On top of this, 
three death civilian bodies were found that were probably being executed without a fair trial 
by Malian soldiers on the 19th February 2014.80     
Short-term focus  
To continue, there are signs that the EU initially adopted a rather short-term perspective. 
Training four battle groups would never be sufficient to guarantee security in the country by 
the Malian army for the long term. This initial perspective has been proven by the actions of 
General Bruno Guibert, heading the mission, who eventually made amendments to the 
mission to ensure the Malian armed forces will be able to keep a training center in Koulikoro 
up and running, plus providing the decentralized instruction in each battalion that is essential 
to ensure lasting expertise.81 An extension of the mission for two years was needed to ensure 
long-term engagement. Additionally, the inclusion of modules on humanitarian principles is 
not based on a long-term approach as the mandate only allows the training of the actual 
forces. To ensure these modules have sustainable consequences the mandate of EUTM 
should not be limited to trainings; instead it should also provide support for gender 
integration and institutional reforms in building the Malian forces. Until now this is the 
responsibility of the government itself and the EU does not have an impact on this process. 
EUCAP Sahel Mali established in April 2014 is helping to ensure a long-term solution for the 
security challenges in the country. The HR/VP confirmed this by saying that the EUCAP 
Sahel Mali was established ‘to help build a lasting solution’.82 The amendments done uncover 
the initial military and short-term approach of the security policy and are installed to adopt a 
more long-term focus within the security policy. 
Sub-conclusion: security successes        
The security policy of the EU achieved moderate successes. Findings indicate that deficiencies 
remain. The EU initially focused mainly on military objectives based on a short-term 
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perspective. As the EU strives for security to be sustainable the security policy is not 
considered successful, as it initially hindered a long-term approach. In addition, the EUTM 
did not ensure sufficient capacities of the Malian army yet. The establishment of EUCAP 
Sahel, however, contributes to the achievement of long-term objectives in the area of security. 
The extension of EUTM also expresses EU’s commitment for the long-term, which indicates 
the EU turned its short-term approach into a long-term approach. In conclusion, until now 
the security policy is not entirely successful as it became evident that the EU did impede itself 
in achieving its objectives.   
4.4. Development support  
Development aid was mobilized towards different sectors, such as developmental projects, 
security support, political reforms, and humanitarian needs. In this section the progress on 
development objectives will be reviewed, in which funds are directly aimed to support 
developmental projects and to directly support the government to stimulate development 
objectives. The European donors made clear that the (interim) government must live up to its 
promises to implement democratic and social reforms in exchange for the international 
lifeline.83 This refers to funds that were established to cope with the food crisis, safety 
programmes, education, health and efforts to resume conditions for long-term development. 
Development aid through the SBC was mainly to restore state authority in the north and 
eventually restore the delivery of basic services. It is aiming to phase out humanitarian 
assistance as soon as possible in order to enhance development in the long-term. 
Indicators of development progress 
Direct impact on the population 
As first response to the crisis the EU limited its development aid to programs directly 
supporting the local population.84  After adopting the Transitional Roadmap it was decided 
to resume development cooperation with the government. Funds under the SBC were 
provided gradually. The initial interruption of direct government budget support contributed 
to a decrease in government budget by one third in April 2013 and a contraction of the 
economy by 1.2 per cent.85 In the beginning the government struggled to provide sufficient 
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qualitative basic services to the entire country. Local government structures could not manage 
their plans and basic services were only partially provided. Though, it is understandable that 
a guarantee of the willingness of the government for transformation is needed to ensure 
development assistance is well spent. These halted funds were mobilized later under the SBC 
in order to provide a quick context-based reaction when political conditions were met. 
Through coordination of development and humanitarian aid the EU had direct impact on 
the population. It supported 70 per cent of the health centers in the north, constructed 256 
boreholes and wells, 61 water supply systems and 2,934 latrines.86  In 2012-2013 900.000 
people reached food assistance and more than 100.000 children were treated against 
malnutrition.87. This direct support to the populations is necessary to rebuild Mali. Without 
public services sustainable development is impossible.88  
Deficiencies of developmental progress  
The effectiveness of development aid 
Nevertheless, M. Jongman was doubtful concerning the degree of progress made in the 
development area.  Currently, the full return to long-term programs is still not possible, as 
development programs based on short-term objectives remain necessary to provide an answer 
on the primary needs of the local communities.89  Whilst a significant amount of funds were 
available for the purpose of basic services, it could be questioned what fundamentally is 
changed in the northern region. Providing basic services is defined as one of the priority 
themes in the Sustainable Recovery Plan. Similarly the ICG argued in April 2013 that the 
state should prioritize the needs of the communities in the north that were largely left on their 
own, all the more so as foreign aid has been unfrozen.90 This points out that the government, 
with backing of the international community, should have the ability to make a difference. 
However, in January 2014 it still did not achieve this objective as the ICG presented in its 
report and declared that the government had been ‘slow’ in restoring basic services.91 This 
indicates that the government could have speeded up the progress. Also the Oxford Research 
Group points that “the Malian government has a relatively good capacity to absorb aid but close attention 
will be required to see that funds are spent transparently and wisely rather than to reinforce patronage networks. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 EC, ‘Commissioner Piebalgs visit Mali on anniversary of donor conference to launch new projects’, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-553_en.htm, consulted on 20th of October 2014. 
87 Ibidem. 
88 Republic of Mali, Sustainable Recovery Plan 2013-2014, p. 7  
89 T. Timmermans, T. (ed), Progress report MINUSMA, including general developments in Mali October 2014, p.6.  
90 ICG, Mali: Security Dialogue and Meaningful Reform, p. 34. 
91 ICG, Mali: Reform or Relapse, p. 1. 
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Northern infrastructure is more lacking by neglect than conflict-damaged.”92 Whilst development aid was 
available fundamental progress is not yet visible. The EU Sahel Representative of the Sahel 
(EU SR) confirmed this during the second international follow-up meeting of donors in 
February 2014. His words were: “It is clear that while not everything lies ahead, a lot remains to be 
done” followed by “nothing is resolved”.93 Also the statement of Cornaro, Deputy Director 
General for Development and Cooperation, demonstrates that the government did not 
fulfilled its promises towards to the donors. He declared:  “I would not call it baby-sitting, but I 
think we need to partner-sit the process and really focus on it regularly and keep that commitment”.94   
Sub-conclusion: developmental successes 
The EU is financially supporting the government in providing basic services. However, 
progress on developmental objectives remain slow. The full transition to long-term 
development objectives is still not made, due to priority needs that need to be answered. The 
findings indicate that there is not an efficient fulfillment of the objectives of EU’s development 
aid, as the destinations of the funds did not resulted in the main objectives. The EU could be 
attributable for this, as it would have to ensure the effectiveness of funds by closely 
monitoring, observing and urging for transparency. The EU should find better ways in order 
to ensure the Malian government spends EU funds on the right purposes. Thus, the findings 
indicate that the EU funds for development projects affecting the population directly are 
positive, but results of direct budget support to the government remain insufficient. Therefore 
this policy area could not be called entirely successful.  
4.5. Integration 
In this section the degree of integration of EU policies is examined. Policies are integrated in 
case they are harmonized, meaning that they don’t operate compartmentalized. They should 
work for the same purpose and not negatively affect each other. Firstly, all tools combined in 
the initial response to the crisis are evaluated, followed by an evaluation of each pillar’s 
integration into the larger EU strategy for Mali. The section will concentrate on the effects of 
each policy on other policies and how each policy fits into the larger strategy of the EU 
towards Mali.  
Initial response: combining all tools  
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After analyzing EU documents during its response to the crisis it became evident that the four 
policies are combined in a logical manner. The use of political and developmental tools are 
certainly integrated. By stopping development cooperation the EU put pressure on the junta 
in order to stimulate political transformation. Likewise political statements were used to put 
leverage on the government to adopt a Transitional Roadmap as soon as possible with the 
ultimate goal of installing a legitimate constitutional government. Using its developmental 
tools as political leverage became evident in the statement wherein the Council stated it only 
resumes development in case a credible roadmap has been adopted. Only development 
programs on democratic transition and direct support to the population were continued, as 
well as humanitarian aid. For the EU, political progress had priority and the development 
pillar was helping to achieve this goal. This political approach was caused by the belief that 
political stability is the condition for sustainable development that was concluded in the 
Foreign Affairs meeting in March 2013. Development cooperation was stopped and, 
politically, the Council adopted several declarations for a restoration of civil and 
constitutional order and condemned the seizure of power by force. Meanwhile it continued 
the dialogue with the Malian authorities. The development and political pillars were working 
for the same purpose to install a legitimate government. Hence, this demonstrates that there 
was a priority setting within EU’s overall policy.     
 Because initially direct budget support was put on halt, the interim government was 
unable to provide basic services in the north. However, the EU reacted coherently by 
continuing direct budget support for the population from development funds and increasing 
humanitarian support. This ensured the integration of the development and humanitarian 
pillars. Development resources were used to assist humanitarian purposes, which means a 
reconciliation of principles. The other pillars of the strategy met the consequences of the 
political pillar that had put pressure on the government. This means that the pillars of politics, 
development and humanitarian assistance were coming together.   
 Additionally, the security pillar was logically included in its response. The security 
policy, wherein it supported AFISMA and MINUSMA and established of EUTM Mali and 
EUCAP Sahel Mali, functioned because it believed stabilization is a necessary condition for 
humanitarian, development and political purposes. The Council already concluded in March 
2011 that improving the security situation is integral to economic growth and reduction of 
poverty.95 Another example of the Council packing all policies into a larger whole is its 
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conclusion on the 19th of November 2012 where it states that security policy should support 
political objectives and complement the political process in Mali. This also came to the 
forefront in an answer on a European Parliamentary (EP) question concerning the security 
and humanitarian situation of Mali. The HR/VP confirmed EU’s alertness on security 
objectives in the north ‘to be accompanied’ by a political process of national reconciliation.96 
This indicates a mindset that takes all policies into account to act as a comprehensive whole.
 B. Soret declared that within EU’s crisis response all EU tools were working 
complementary and in synergy. He underlined that there was no comprehensive strategy in 
advance, but that the EU established a response strategy comprehensively as soon as possible. 
He admits that improvements are always possible, because institutional constraints are always 
present.97 These constraints relate to how the different instruments are organized, what they 
stand for and how they are used to the different program cycles of the different institutions.98
 After analyzing the EP questions in 2012, 2013 and 2014 no indications are found 
regarding policies that were directly negatively affecting each other. Only the EP’s remark on 
the initial lack of coordination of all partners involved was confirmed as the Commission 
stated in response that it was ‘improved’.99 The word ‘improved’ points out that coordination 
remained a challenge.          
 Additionally, the Council statements show that the appointment of the EU SR was 
delayed. The definition of the SR is as follows:  
‘The EU SRs support the work of Catherine Ashton, in the regions concerned. They play an 
important role in the development of a stronger and more effective EU CFSP and in the Union’s 
efforts to become a more effective, more coherent and more capable actor on the world stage.’100  
In December 2012 the proposal of the HR/VP was welcomed and it insisted to take the 
procedure of appointing someone in this position without delay. In January 2013 the Council 
urged that immediately a Council decision should be presented by the HR/VP so that the SR 
could be appointed. One month later the Council invited the HR/VP to submit a proposal as 
soon as possible for the appointment of the SR. The use of the words ‘without delay’, 
‘immediately’ and ‘as soon as possible’ signify that there was an urgent need for someone with 
the responsibility to make policies coherent. The SR was only established on the 18th of 
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97 Interview conducted with B. Soret, former member EU delegation Mali and current head of Mali/Sahel desk, EEAS, 
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March 2013. The urgent need for the SR, which became visible in the EU statements, means 
that within the initial phase of the crisis there was a shortcoming in the integration of policies.
 The analysis of EU policies shows that the EU actively integrated its policies in the 
field during the first response. It appears that in the overall EU strategy different EU actors 
worked on cross-purposes. All tools were very well addressed and logically combined. 
However, there is no question of complete harmonization as the findings have indicated. An 
in-depth analysis will now follow to see how each pillar fits in the overall strategy. The effects 
of each pillar on the other pillars are being elaborated during the management phase of the 
conflict. 
Politics within the overall strategy 
The State Building Contract 
The SBC is a good example of integrating the political and development side of EU’s 
strategy. Through the SBC the primary focus is on political transformation. After analyzing 
various EU documents it remains vague what the benchmarks are exactly under the SBC. 
Within the literature and EU documents little is written about this budget agreement. After 
an analysis with important stakeholders the ECDPM101 observed that what matters in the 
SBC is that the country expresses willingness to adhere to values of democracy, rule of law 
and human rights in the course of the further development of the country.102 The funds under 
the SBC were directed towards what was perceived as necessary at that time. In the case of 
Mali the EU provided support for the organization of elections when the dates were 
announced in the Transitional Roadmap. Both development and political policies thus work 
for the same purpose: political transition. There is agreement about setting this priority. It 
also prioritizes the need for the delivery of basic services. The Commissioner for 
Development Piebalgs explained this context-based approach as follow: “The size and mode of 
delivery of the development package will have to fully take into consideration the needs of Mali in the new 
circumstances created by the conflict and in particular the urgent necessity to assist its government in 
maintaining basic services in a context of extreme budgetary hardship.”103 The framework of the SBC 
seems logical and useful, because it combines development and politic tools. In addition, it is 
flexible on the use of the development budget. The organized elections are a good example of 
the combination of political tools and development tools. Through political pressure (in 
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statements and through the SBC) it called for the organization of democratic elections and 
the development funds provided the means to support this objective. Both policies are 
working jointly to achieve the same purpose.       
 Nevertheless, the EU could have had more impact on the political objectives by using 
the SBC more effectively. There are signs in which the government hindered the speed of 
political progress. The lack of political progress is outlined in the section of 4.1. and includes 
deficiencies in the progress of reconciliation, providing basic services, transparency and 
justice. These political deficits also hinder the progress on objectives of the development and 
humanitarian pillars. The findings indicate that the attitude of the Malian government 
withheld the speed of the political progress. Soret pointed out that the government did not 
respond to the commitments made at the end of the transition.104 After resuming 
development aid in February 2013, the EU decided to put halt on its aid through the SBC 
only one time when the IMF alarmed because of the poor management of Mali’s public 
finances in May 2014.  This is a very modest reaction to the incomplete devotion of the 
government for political progress in several areas. Former Prime Minister Ly confirms this 
observation about the government’s attitude. He resigned in April 2014 and declared that the 
deficiencies in the work of the government inhibited his ability to address the core challenges 
facing the country and fast-track reforms urgently needed to improve government 
performance.105           
 The EU could have adopted a firmer approach since the beginning by drafting harder 
conditions in its SBC and could have used sanctions more often by stopping development 
cooperation in case it noticed signs of government’s obstruction for progress. The soft 
approach of the EU is confirmed by the fact that The Netherlands and Germany initiated a 
debate within the EU in which they urged for more political criteria under the SBC and more 
political dialogue.106 The SBC should function as an integrated tool of development and 
politics, in which both work for the same purpose. However, in practice the EU still delivered 
a significant part of funds directly to the government in spite of the deficiencies of political 
progress. The criteria for funding under the SBC is labeled as ‘the country’s expression of 
willingness’, which is quite vague. But judging from this criterion it seems that the findings in 
chapter 4.1. show that there are many deficiencies within the political process that do not 
refer to a resolute willingness of the government for transformation. Instead the government 
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obstructs an accelerated political progress and has not sustained commitment. Soret is of the 
opinion that it is EU’s interest to push the government into the right direction and therefore 
regrets it that things do not go any faster.107 This statement also refers to the fact that the EU 
features a soft approach. In case it included stronger benchmarks under the SBC it would 
have enhanced government’s devotion to speed up the political reforms. Until now too much 
liberty was given to the government, in which it did not fully complied the steps of the 
Transitional Roadmap.          
 One reason for EU’s soft mentality could be explained by the concepts of African 
ownership and sovereignty, which are important values for the EU. The fact that not all 
developmental funds are covered under the SBC also undermines EU’s leverage. However, it 
seems unfair that the EU should provide unconditional support in case there are signs of 
government’s unwillingness. In more than two years no fundamental milestones are reached 
within the reconciliation progress, providing basic services and political reforms in the north. 
The EU’s impact on the government is not of a high level. As the biggest donor of Mali the 
EU could have put more political weight that could have profound results. Thus, the findings 
demonstrate that the SBC, a tool in which political and development instruments should be 
integrated, is not entirely effective.    
Security within the overall strategy 
Insecurity has a high impact on the progress of other policies, for example EU’s development 
projects were being interrupted when the crisis broke out.108 The importance of the security 
policy is also underlined in an answer on an EP question. Ashton recognized the connection 
between the CSDP policy and politics as she stated: “Securing the return of state control to the north 
of the country as a necessary part of the political negotiations and reconciliation process, requires considerable 
military means which are currently beyond the scope of Mali alone”.109 The EUTM and EUCAP Sahel 
Mali are established to support the political process. The EUTM has, besides the security task 
of training soldiers, the political task to make the army more resilient, less inclined for 
corruption and to eliminate other factors that triggered the coup d’état.110 This is executed by 
providing direct advice to the government on how to reform the security sector. Security is a 
condition for the long-term development projects. This is recognized in the Sahel Strategy. 
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The decision to reform and extend the EUTM Mali and establish EUCAP Sahel Mali is the 
appropriate response to the ongoing security challenges is Mali, since it takes into account 
that development cooperation will only flourish in case of stabilization. Security would enable 
progress on development projects, accessibility of humanitarian actors and the reconciliation 
process.          
 The importance of a security policy for humanitarian objectives is recognized. Within 
the CSDP missions humanitarian/civilian principles are being reconciled. In order to 
improve the working conditions for humanitarian actors in the conflict zones ECHO 
undertook action when they heard of the possible EUTM. ECHO representative Barbier 
declared that when ECHO heard of plans for an EU training mission to improve the capacity 
of the Malian army, ECHO strongly advocated for humanitarian principles and international 
humanitarian law to be included in the package.111 This would diminish the breaching of 
human rights during reprisals, correspondingly by the Malian army, and improve the ability 
of humanitarian actors to work efficiently. Including lessons on international humanitarian 
law is a clear sign of integration of military and humanitarian principles. However, we could 
not speak of entirely harmonized policies. The words ‘when we heard of plans’ indicate that 
ECHO was not involved in making or was at first glance not heard in making the CSDP 
plans. This shows that at first stage there was no harmonization in making policies.  
 Another sign undermining a fully harmonized strategy became evident when in July 
2013 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch denounced that human rights 
violations of the Malian army are at the order of the day. The EUTM declares that it 
therefore asks civil society to hand over names of soldiers responsible for these crimes. 
However, insufficient reconciliation of principles in this case are present, because the EUTM 
considers the issue of the trainees past records to be a political matter irrelevant to their 
military training.112 This statement in a BBC interview specifies a real shortcoming of EU’s 
security policy being interwoven within the overall EU strategy. This demonstrates that the 
EU’s military trainers see the EUTM separate from EU policies that support humanitarian 
and political principles, such as justice and truth. The commander Colonel Alexis Uhrich 
labeled the EUTM as a soldier factory.113 This reflects merely a military approach, instead of 
having in mind the bigger picture of EU’s strategy in Mali. Also M. Jongman assumes that the 
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military mission did not bring all aspects of the EU strategy together.114 In addition, many 
people in the north remained unpunished, which was identified in a question of the EP to the 
HR/VP. One component of the EUTM is that it provides the government advice for security 
sector reform, which indicates a reconciliation of political and security objectives. However, 
progress remains slow as people stay unpunished in the northern region. Therefore the 
establishment of EUCAP Sahel Mali is a good step in the right direction to enhance justice. It 
provides strategic training and advice for the reform of the internal security sectors, which 
eventually enables the reform of the state. Thus, the EUCAP Sahel mission supports political 
goals such as good governance and justice. Moreover the IfS complements the goals of 
EUCAP Sahel Mali, as it is used for financing contra-terrorism, trainings, equipment and 
special police forces. Therefore the EUCAP Sahel Mali fits more within a harmonized 
approach than the EUTM.           
 When analyzing the website of the EU delegation in Mali it becomes evident that 
within the internal organization there is no position on security matters, whilst other functions 
on politics, infrastructure, development, economy, finances and contracts and administration 
are fulfilled. This questions its ability to bring all policies together in the field. The delegation 
has the function to implement EU’s strategy within Mali and therefore needs to ensure an 
integrated approach, whereby all policies should come together.     
 Lastly, a critical finding emphasized by M. Jongman is the fact that the SBC only 
addressed political and developmental objectives. The EC, particularly developmental actors, 
drafted the SBC. It would have been more credible if the PSC was included in this 
agreement. The CSDP missions are not fully aware of the political objectives and within the 
SBC nothing is mentioned concerning the conditions of the Malian army.  
Development within the overall strategy  
The objectives of development funds have some overlap with other objectives from other 
pillars. DG ECHO is continuously in contact with DG DEVCO. EU support prioritizes 
stabilization and therefore links relief to rehabilitation and development. The development 
and humanitarian areas were very well integrated, as they work jointly to provide an answer 
on the first basic needs of the population. After the coup d’état development cooperation was 
put on hold except for those projects that would directly have impact on the population. 
Basically the objectives of humanitarian aid and development cooperation were being 
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reconciled to provide as soon as possible a response to the crisis to secure the basic needs of 
the population. Another example is that both are addressing the objective of providing food 
security in the Sahel region. ECHO is providing emergency food aid and DEVCO 
complements to provide food security on the long run. One example of the cross-sector 
collaboration which Soret mentioned is the Food for Work program which provides 
immediate food needs but also enables a community to enhance its self-sufficiency, enabled 
by both DEVCO and ECHO.         
 Furthermore, the development pillar is working with the CSDP missions on security 
sector reform by military and civilian means. Also the IfS is addressing this issue. DEVCO is 
aware of the political progress and objectives through the SBC. However, as mentioned it 
could be adopting a firmer approach by leveraging its development aid for political change 
and institutional reforms even more than is done now through the SBC. This would make the 
policies positively aligning each other to achieve the priority objective. A bigger emphasis on 
political progress and on the assurance that the government will take its responsibility would 
facilitate achieving developmental objectives, such as providing basic services, reduce poverty, 
and eventually achieve long-term development.       
 Thus, the development pillar has overlap with other pillars. This is a good sign of 
integration and indicates various EU actors are working for the same purpose. Though, it 
could use the development pillar more efficiently to achieve political progress in the country. 
Humanitarian policy in the overall strategy 
As already mentioned, development and humanitarian policies are very well integrated. Even 
the EU commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response 
called for a humanitarian response which links relief to rehabilitation and development and 
reconciliation. Thereby, he also mentioned the political side of the strategy, namely 
reconciliation efforts. This indicates a perspective that incorporates the various EU policies.
 Still providing basic services is heavily relying on humanitarian organizations instead 
on the Malian government. Here again more pressure should be given via the political canal 
on the Malian government for humanitarian purposes. Thus improvements could be made 
through better integration between the humanitarian- and political sector. This is confirmed 
in a briefing note of the International Displacement Monitoring Centre in February 2014, 
wherein the inability of the government to have an impact on the development and 
humanitarian strategies is mentioned. The center also calls for a closer inclusion of the 
government within the humanitarian sector to ensure coordination and 
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comprehensiveness.115 Including the humanitarian sector within the SBC, so also including 
ECHO, would have facilitated more inclusion of the government into the humanitarian 
sector. Humanitarian security is a tangible factor contributing to the process of ‘state building’ 
as the lack of basic services causes the population’s distrust in the government. It would be a 
real integrated EU strategy when the SBC included conditions on the government’s 
involvement in the humanitarian work or coordination. ECHO should be included in 
drafting the SBC, instead that the contract is drawn up by only development actors. Including 
ECHO would make the government more involved in the humanitarian work, which would 
stimulate the government to bear greater responsibility in this area.    
 Finally, it should be mentioned that ECHO’s priority is to stay politically neutral. 
ECHO and its partner organizations want to remain neutral to guarantee their access to 
regions where their assistance is needed. They act according the humanitarian principles. 
Consequently, it does not want to get involved in other policies, particularly with those 
working in the political and military pillar. At first instance it looks like this would hamper a 
totally integrated approach. However, Soret emphasized that just because of the fact that it 
works independently it could work when the crisis broke out, in contrast to the other policies 
of the EU. He argued: “ECHO is not injuring or endangering the comprehensive approach. On the 
contrary, it made it acceptable to work in a situation where it was not able to use other instruments.”116 The 
work of ECHO fits in the overall strategy. It ensured EU’s ability to assist the most vulnerable 
people in the northern region, which was set as a priority in EU’s crisis response strategy, 
when all other instruments could not yet be applied. Additionally, ECHO brings emergency 
relief, which eventually is linked to the long-term objective of development and thereby it 
positively affects other policies of the EU. 
Sub-conclusion integration 
Overall, the EU response to the crisis demonstrates it is integrating its policies. The SBC is a 
structure that enables them to act rapid and mobilize funds within a context-based approach. 
However, there are still some findings that indicate a total integration of policies is not yet 
completed. The EU could have used its development instrument more efficient to have a 
bigger impact on the political objectives, for example by setting harder criteria to provide 
development funds under the SBC. Political progress is important as a lack of it undermines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 IDMC, ‘Mali: Ongoing pursuit of durable solutions’, http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-
africa/mali/2014/mali-ongoing-pursuit-of-durable-solutions/, consulted on 21th of December 2014. 
116 Interview conducted with B. Soret, former member EU delegation Mali and current head of Mali/Sahel desk, EEAS, 
Brussels, on the 16th of January 2015. 
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the objectives of the other pillars in EU’s strategy. It also became evident that the security 
pillar is not fully harmonized with the other pillars. To link the security pillar more with the 
political pillars an inclusion of the security objectives into the SBC could be an option. Also 
including ECHO in the SBC would make it a more a whole. Political objectives, such as 
reconciliation, are also related to the security objectives in the country. Therefore, the EU 
could have put more pressure on political progress through the SBC, which would have 
enabled an acceleration of stabilizing the country.  
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H.5.  Do EU policies in Mali align with the principles of a comprehensive 
approach? 
In this section EU’s efforts to build up a comprehensive strategy towards Mali are being 
examined. It is scrutinized whether the principles of a CA are aligning with EU’s policies. In 
chapter 2.2. the principles of EU’s CA were explained as the following ones: a 
multidimensional approach, coherency, multilateralism, focus on the entire conflict cycle, the 
nexus between security and development, and the combination of short- and long term 
objectives. Each principle will be discussed in order to conclude whether the EU respects the 
principles of the CA.   
5.1.  The multidimensional approach 
The EU should have a multidimensional approach in case its wants to be comprehensive, 
which means that it should use all the instruments at its disposal. A complex conflict requires 
the involvement of different instruments in order to reach a solution. Contemporary conflicts 
cannot be solved with solely military instruments. The EU can be characterized as an 
organization with different tools at its reach. To address the complexity of the conflict the EU 
needs to adopt a multidimensional approach by using its different tools.   
 As explained the EU set up a crisis response strategy consisting of various tools: 
political dialogue, civilian and military security capacities, development cooperation and 
humanitarian assistance. Furthermore the Sahel Strategy includes various forms of assistance 
in the areas of development, counter-radicalization, diplomacy, development and counter-
terrorism. The projects of this strategy were continued when the context allowed. They were 
adapted to the specific circumstances when needed and it was tried to implement and 
accelerate them. The use of all these tools is confirmed in the communication of the Council 
in March 2012 that under the Sahel Strategy ‘all EU instruments in the fields of development, 
governance, rule of law, migration and security to support the socio-economic development 
of Mali’ is used to enhance the capacity of Mali to deal with crime and terrorism.117 In the 
Council Conclusions on 17 March 2014 migration and trade issues were emphasized, which 
confirms the use of all the tools the EU has at its disposal. This argument is confirmed 
through a source other than from within the Union, Mali’s Prime Minister Oumar Tatam Ly, 
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http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129222.pdf, consulted on 2nd of January 
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who spoke of the ‘multi-form assistance’ of the EU.118 Soret acknowledged during the 
interview that all instruments were used that could be mobilized in dealing with the crisis: 
from humanitarian aid to development aid, and from rapid instruments, such as human rights 
instruments and the instrument for stability, to CSDP missions.119    
 Not every tool is used equally ambitious; therefore activities should be complementary 
with the activities of others in the field. For example, considering its security policies the EU is 
not active in combat operations, it only takes the responsibility for the trainings of forces. The 
cooperation with other actors will be discussed later in the chapter under the section of 
multilateralism.          
 The Sahel Strategy and EU’s response to the crisis were established by combining 
various EU tools. It therefore can be concluded that the EU uses its entire toolbox, a mixture 
of instruments, to address the complexity of the conflict.   
5.2.  Coherence  
The EU strives to ensure a coherent foreign policy. The principle of coherence signifies that 
EU’s foreign policies should be interrelated and put together. These efforts should come to 
the foreground in practice. The HR/VP and the EEAS are responsible for the coherence of 
external policies. There is no into-depth analysis of EU’s internal structures, because the 
research is limited to an analysis of the operationalization of the CA in Mali. Therefore it is 
examined whether the principle of coherence is underpinned and visible within EU’s response 
to this specific conflict. It is important to analyze what has been done to ensure the coherence 
of policies to limit contradictions in its strategy.     
 After initiation of the conflict the EU decided to establish two Crisis platforms in 
which different EU actors come together. This contributed to the coherence of policies. 
Jongman was really positive about these platforms and about the decision to send an inter-
service mission, in which all the actors together decide on the needs of Mali to create an EU 
strategy.120 Hence, the pillars do not longer operate compartmentalized.   
 There are more signs within EU communications that indicate EU’s efforts to ensure 
coherency. One example is EU’s support for coherence mechanisms. In October 2012 the 
Council called for the mechanism of coordination to be extended and it stressed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 L’Agence Europe, ‘(AE) Mali: EU takes stock on Mali and renews its commitments’, Bulletin Quotidien Europe, nr. 11012 
(2014) 
119 Interview with B. Soret, former civil servant at EU delegation in Mali, current teamleader Mali/Sahel desk, EEAS, 
Brussels, Belgium, on the 16th of January 2015.   
120 Orientation conversation with M. Jongman, former employee at the Permanent Representation of the Netherland to 
Brussels and participant of the Africa and ACP Council Working groups within the EU, on the 31st of October 2014. 
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importance of the Support and Follow-up group on Mali. The use of ‘stresses’ indicate that 
within its approach coherence is perceived as significant as this group should ensure 
coordination between Malian stakeholders and international actors and an holistic approach 
to the crisis in Mali through concrete measures to the different challenges within the 
country.121 In later EU communications it called for regular meetings of this group. There are 
more international platforms in which the EU cooperates with other actors, but those will be 
discussed extensively under the principle of multilateralism. However, the platforms function 
to safeguard coherence between policies from within the CFSP. Moreover, the EU operates 
with an even broader perspective, as other actors are participating within these platforms as 
well.              
 To ensure coherence within the Sahel region the EU undertook significant efforts, 
such as the creation of the Sahel Strategy. All EU activities in the region were put together 
into one strategy. As the challenges within these countries were interlinked, the EU adopted 
an approach that took into consideration the relations between them by connecting its 
policies. In an early stage of the Malian conflict the EU immediately realized the possible 
synergies with other EU actions in the region. This became clear, because it mentioned that 
the establishment of EUCAP Sahel Niger in 2012 should reinforce regional cooperation122 
and complement other actions funded from EU developmental and humanitarian funds.123 It 
also called for the continuation of coherence and synergies between EU’s instruments 
including other CSDP activities in the wider region.124 According to the Council conclusions 
in October 2012 the HR/VP puts the possible EUTM in line with the political objectives, 
which also indicates cohesion. In EU communications the terminology ‘complement’ is 
regularly used, which defines that the EU realized the synergies between its policies. It cited 
that the EUCAP Sahel Mali should be complementary to the EUTM and to the EU’s 
broader engagement in Mali. In the Council decision to launch EUCAP Sahel, article 14 
denotes the responsibility of the HR/VP to ensure consistency of the implementation of the 
CSDP mission with the Union’s external actions as a whole, including development 
programs. All these facts prove that the EU strives to put its tools together.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 UN SC, ‘Communiqué on the situation on Mali’ http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
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122 European Council, ‘Council Conclusion on Mali/Sahel’, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2012808%202012%20INIT, consulted on 31st of December 
2014. 
123 EEAS, ‘CSDP Civil Mission in Sahel’, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1704249/fact_sheet_sahel_coordinated9_july.pdf, consulted on 31st of December 
2014.  
124 European Council, ‘Council Conclusion on Mali’, 
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 Furthermore, the EU Mali delegation obtains the role to bring policies together in the 
field and to ensure good implementation of synergized policies. The HR/VP also decided to 
install a EU SR for the Sahel. The SR needs to ensure the coherence between policies within 
the region. It has the role to coordinate EU’s CA to the regional crisis on the basis of the 
Sahel Strategy for security and development. There are various signals that reflect EU’s 
efforts to ensure communication between the different EU actors. The Council called the 
EEAS, SR and Commission to develop a new regional action plan as a continuation of the 
Sahel strategy. Furthermore, it states that the Head of the Mission will be in close contact 
with the delegation to ensure the consistency of Union action and that the head of EUCAP 
Sahel Mali and the SR shall initiate consultation as necessary.125 The contact between the 
delegation and the SR is mentioned as well. And the EUCAP Sahel Mali Head of Mission, 
the head of EU SR shall initiate talk when needed. This determination to ensure 
communication will contribute to the coherence of EU policies.     
 The fact that within the EU it is referred to the coherence of policies in 
communications about Mali means that it is perceived as vital to conduct its policies 
comprehensive. It can be concluded that coherence is a principle that is been taken into 
account in the making of the strategy for Mali.  
5.3.  Multilateralism 
The principle of multilateralism means that the EU should cooperate with national and 
international actors in order to deal with the conflict.    
 Under the Sahel Strategy it worked closely with the authorities of countries within the 
region, civil society and regional and international bodies, including the AU and ECOWAS 
to address the challenges within the Sahel.126 Several times the EU mentioned it cooperates 
with other actors and that it works in partnerships with regional organizations and other 
international partners, for example in the Council Conclusions in March 2012 and April 
2012. In July 2012 the Council reaffirmed its commitment to work in close coordination with 
the UN, AU, ECOWAS and the other regional and international partners concerned.127 EU 
actions also are ‘in accordance’ with the principles approved by ECOWAS, the UN and the 
AU and is ‘in close conjunction’ with ECOWAS, the AU and UN, which proves the existence 
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126 European Council, ‘Council conclusions on a European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’, 
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2014. 
127 European Council, ‘Council conclusion on Mali/Sahel’, 
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of coordination and cooperation between the actors involved. Overall, the EU acts within the 
framework of the UNSC, as it believes that the UNSC has the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.128 It therefore provided support to AFISMA 
and MINUSMA, authorized by UNSC resolution 2085 and UNSC resolution 2100. EU 
member states contribute to the ability of the UN to take this responsibility. An example of 
close cooperation between the EU and the UN is that between MINUSMA, EUTM Mali 
and EUCAP Sahel Mali liaison officers are exchanged and regular consultations take place.
 Furthermore, there are certain platforms wherein the EU participates and cooperates 
with different organizations. Within the mechanism for coordination and the Support- and 
Follow up Group on Mali the EU cooperates with important actors, such as the AU, UN and 
ECOWAS. Besides these mechanisms, the Alliance Globale pour L’initiative Resilience 
(AGIR) is launched to provide food security. It participates in the joint High Level meetings 
on Mali that include five leaders (the UN, World Bank, AU, African Development Bank and 
EU) amongst the multilateral institutions and organizations more active in the field of security 
and development in the Sahel.129 These meetings constitute the international coordination 
platform of the Sahel. The donor conference in Brussels of May 2013 is also an explicit 
example of multilateralism, since it brought together 108 delegations and institutions, 
including heads of State and Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, senior representatives 
of regional and international institution with representatives of local authorities, civil society, 
the diaspora and the private sector.130 Moreover, follow-up meetings of this conference were 
organized to ensure the exchange of information between various actors. And other Sahel 
strategies, other than EU’s Sahel Strategy, are being developed in the international arena by 
international organizations and donors, such as the UN, France and the World Bank. This is 
a positive sign that there is much preparedness to deal with the challenges. Whether they all 
could exist along each other efficiently still needs to become clear. The ECDPM131 supports 
the presumption that the existence of all these strategies raises questions about their relevance, 
their consideration of each other and their usefulness in the years to come.132 Also the EU 
realizes this, because it stated in March 2014 that the international coordination platform 
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129 EC, ‘EU reinforces its support for the Sahel for the years to come ’, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-
1013_en.htm, consulted on 3rd of January 2015. 
130 Joint Chairs Conclusions, ‘International Donors Conference ‘Together for a New Mali’, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/conclusions_-_mali_-_15.05_en.pdf, consulted on 20th of December 2014. 
131 European Centre for Development Policy Management 
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should function as a mechanism for all the existing strategies in the region.133 This fact shows 
the need for better international cooperation to exchange information and align strategies to 
prevent inefficiencies.           
 The EU is clear about the reconciliation of EU policies with those of the member 
states. Member states were invited to participate in the inter-service mission on the 28th of 
January 2013134 and the Council called all member states to review actions under the Sahel 
strategy for the northern region of Mali.135 Thereby, the Commissioner Piebalgs organized 
coordination meetings by which all development ministers of member states were represented 
and the EU delegation took responsibility for the division of labour between EU donors.136 
Additionally, the EU Joint Programming coordinates EU aid and bilateral aid from member 
states. Member states took over the EU criteria under the SBC to decide on the delivering of 
aid. Additionally, cooperation was present from security perspective, as the French counter-
operation was bilaterally supported by other EU member states. Also Koenders, the Dutch 
Minister of Foreign Affairs considers the cooperation between the French operation and the 
Dutch active in MINUSMA as solid and without a double agenda.137   
 Overall, the EU is obviously supporting the multilateral framework in dealing with the 
crisis. It shows its willingness for cooperation among different actors, multiple international 
cooperation initiatives exist and member states are cooperating in order to have the biggest 
impact on Mali.   
5.4.  The conflict-cycle 
Another criterion of the CA is that it should cover all stages of conflict. EU activity towards 
Mali should include preventing conflicts, preparation for conflicts, early warning, crisis 
management, early recovering, stabilization, peace building and get countries back on track 
towards long-term development.         
 In this case EU policy did not include early warning or prevention, as Mali was 
perceived as an example for other African states, particularly because of the democratic 
progress made. However, Mali had been a fragile state and turned into a deep crisis. The 
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conflict was unexpected and therefore early warnings and conflict prevention capacities of the 
EU were not available. Soret, head of the EU delegation, refers this shortcoming as a lesson 
to be learnt for future scenarios with fragile states.138 Also the EP called for a lesson-learned 
analysis of this case and for an improved early warning analysis of key volatile regions, in 
order to establish concrete conflict-prevention and mediation initiatives.139 There was no 
detailed strategy for dealing with the conflict, because it was unnoticed that the conflict was 
coming.          
 When the state collapsed the EU was capable to act rapid as it relatively soon 
established the SBC and the EUTM Mali. The Sahel Strategy was based on a long-term 
perspective, but the EU reallocated its funds by implementing the SBC. The existence of the 
Sahel Strategy could therefore be seen as an advantage, which enabled the EU to rapid 
mobilize funds for dealing with the conflict immediate.    
 Currently, the situation is in the conflict management phase of the conflict cycle. The 
turn into long-term development cannot yet be made. The EU is active in providing support 
for reconciliation and stabilization. Yet, it cannot be concluded whether the EU will stay 
engaged in Mali. Jongman noticed that during the EU –AU summit in April 2014 other 
conflicts were perceived as more actual and important at that time by the PSC’s of both 
Unions due to time-management issues of the summit. However, soon was realized that the 
conflict in Mali was not yet solved. This stresses the fact that the EU will have to prove in the 
coming years that it stays committed, because building up fragile states is a long-term process. 
EU joint communications however indicate that EU has planned to stay committed for a 
longer period of time. In the factsheet of EUTM Mali it defines its determination to maintain 
its commitment. Additionally, in March 2014 it called for the development of a new regional 
action plan and stated it will continue to support sustainable and inclusive socio-economic 
development and regional integration, drawing lessons from the past.140  
 Thus, not having an adequate early warning system the EU should invest more in the 
prevention of conflicts. The EU did not foresee the conflict and therefore initially had no 
response package ready, but through its flexibility it managed to act soon. Until now no 
conclusions can be drawn whether the EU will stay engaged in the following phases of conflict 
to ultimately achieve long-term developments. Though the EU communications show it is 
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planning to do so as it recognizes that long-term engagement is needed to prevent former 
mistakes within its policies towards the country.   
5.5.  The nexus between security and development 
Within EU’s policy the connection between security and development should be taken into 
consideration. This entails that the EU recognizes that without development there will be no 
security and that without security there will be no development. For a right application of the 
CA the connection between these two objectives should be incorporated into EU policies. 
 One key theme of the Sahel Strategy is the link between security and development. 
The strategy elaborates on this relationship extensively as the EEAS assumes that this 
interrelationship is highly relevant in the Sahel region. An explanation of the EEAS in the 
case of Mali made this apparent: 
“The fragility of governments impacts on the stability of the region and the ability to combat 
both poverty and security threats, which are on the rise. Poverty creates inherent stability that can 
impact on uncontrolled migratory flows. The security threat from terrorist activity by al-Quaida 
in the Maghreb (AQIM), which has found a sanctuary in Northern Mali, is focused on 
Western targets and has evolved from taking money to taking life, discouraging investment in the 
region.”141 
However, having a strategy does not signify it is implemented perfectly. The Sahel Strategy 
failed in that perspective, as it was not able to prevent the outbreak of the crisis in 2012. The 
EU was already supporting development in Mali, but apparently this did not positively affect 
the security situation in the country. Thus, EU’s development support was not that successful 
considering it did not reinforce the security situation in the country. The EP was not satisfied 
with the result of the implementation of the strategy, as the deterioration of the situation in 
Mali happened. While beforehand, the EU strategy document was perceived as very 
comprehensive and well prepared.142 Though, the importance of the link between 
development and security towards the Sahel and Mali is always been recognized within the 
EU. Soon after the initiation of the crisis the Council called for an acceleration of the 
implementation of the strategy and their mutual reinforcement of both objectives is 
considered important. The EU even increased its financial resources under the EDF for 
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development- and security projects in the region.      
 Initially, development cooperation was put on hold in the conviction that a secure and 
peaceful environment is needed for long-term development projects. This aligns with the 
context-based approach underpinning the nexus between development and security. This 
response shows that the EU took into account the link between both objectives. The 
mobilization of the APF to support AFISMA is another example of the belief that security is 
key for achieving sustainable development.       
 Besides, the donor conference organized by the EU, France and Mali was based on 
the principle of the nexus between security and development.143 In the factsheet on the 
EUTM Mali the link between security and development is defined and stated that they could 
be mutually reinforcing.144 Soret confirms this by saying that EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel 
relate to the development objectives, because they are helping to create the right 
conditions.145           
 Moreover, there is a shared responsibility of all EU actors that is needed to align the 
principle of the link between security and development. From the beginning of the crisis the 
different actors within the EU system were involved through the Crisis Platforms and the 
inter-service mission. This made each institution taking its responsibility in order to establish 
one EU strategy for Mali. Thereafter, according to the staff from the EEAS, improved 
communication instruments enabled the exchange of information between EU institutions.146 
This contributed to the ability to have a shared responsibility within the EU structure. On top 
of that, member states took their responsibility to provide assistance to MINUSMA, the 
EUTM and/or providing development aid. The Netherlands, Germany and France for 
instance agreed on the division of focus areas wherein the Netherlands focused on health, 
Germany on decentralization and France on education.147      
 Overall, within EU’s policy the connection between security and development is 
included. The challenges in the Sahel region require an approach in which security and 
development are connected and mutually reinforcing. This fact is recognized within EU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Joint Chairs Conclusions, ‘International Donors Conference ‘Together for a New Mali’, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/conclusions_-_mali_-_15.05_en.pdf, consulted on 20th of December 2014. 
144 EEAS, ‘EUTM factsheet’, http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1892457/factsheet_eutm_mali_en_rev1final.pdf, consulted 
on 20th of December 2014. 
145	  Interview with B. Soret, former civil servant at EU delegation in Mali, current teamleader Mali/Sahel desk, EEAS, 
Brussels, Belgium, on the 16th of January 2015.  	  
146 C.V. Rasmussen, Linking instruments in development and foreign policy,  p.13 
147 Dutch Minister of Trade and Development E.M.J. Ploumen, Kamerstuk 32605 nr. 122 Vrief van de Minister voor 
Buitenlandse handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, p.3.	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policy and is taken into account through a context-based approach and shared responsibility 
between EU actors.   
5.6.  The combination of short- and long term objectives 
The combination of short- and long-term objectives should be underpinned in the CA. This 
principle means that EU’s crisis response requires short-term actions, along with long-term 
objectives in order to have a sustainable solution.      
 The Sahel Strategy is based on a long-term and short-term perspective as it includes a 
5/10 years perspective and a 3 years perspective. The EU believes that to have impact on the 
long-term it needs to ensure African ownership and therefore the strategy builds on and 
supports initiatives on a national, regional and international level. Due to the crisis in Mali 
the implementation of long-term projects in Mali could not continue. When the crisis arose 
the EU addressed the short-term objectives within the crisis as it rapidly provided 
humanitarian support and established the EUTM Mali. Development funds were directed 
towards humanitarian needs.          
 Soret declared that the EU combines short- and long-term objectives by the 
availability of different instruments. The EU has instruments at its disposal that provide short-
term objectives and that provide long-term objectives. According to Soret the IfS is an 
excellent example of the combination of short-term and long-term objectives. The stability 
package supports the short-term objective of stabilizing the country that is essential for 
restarting long-term development projects. The short-term part focuses on immediate needs 
to build capacity, for example by supporting the elections and strengthening rule of law. 
These objectives are related to the long-term part of the IfS, whereby long-term projects are 
required to deal with the regional threat of terrorism and international crime in the Sahel. 
Projects established under the short-term component of the IfS are needed for the transition 
to longer-term projects.        
 Another example of the combination of objectives is that the EU is actively involved in 
food-security projects through its participation in AGIR, which is initiated to enhance 
resilience in the Sahel region. ECHO provides emergency food aid under AGIR and 
DEVCO is complementary by working on longer-term food projects. The Food for Work 
programme is an initiative that demonstrates a clear combination of short-term and long-
term objectives as it directly provides food but also ensures that a community will become 
self-sufficient.  Nonetheless, at the current state of crisis the EU did not yet achieved to turn 
humanitarian support completely into long-term development aid. Until now the funds from 
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the EDF were and are mainly addressed for short-term purposes, such as the transition to 
democracy and humanitarian aid. Direct government support is aimed for short- and 
medium objectives and would have to enable the government to function directly. However, 
the government is still not able to provide basic needs to its population. Consequently, the 
long-term objectives are still not effectively procured. In the interview with Soret there was a 
question about which long-term development projects were already going-on in Mali. In his 
response Soret only referred to infrastructure projects. He added that the largest 
infrastructure project was stopped because of security reasons. This demonstrates that the EU 
struggles to turn short-term objectives into long-term objectives, because short-term 
instruments are still needed. Additionally, as is mentioned in chapter four the EUTM is 
focused on short-term objectives. The EU adapted its security policy during the crisis with a 
more long-term focus through the extension of the mandate and the establishment of EUCAP 
Sahel Mali. However, it is unclear whether the EU has a complete transition strategy ready to 
turn all short-term projects into the longer ones.       
 It must be mentioned that the Council conclusions in March 2014 on implementation 
of the Sahel Strategy show that the EU emphasizes the need for a long-term vision. As it 
states that the objectives of the Sahel strategy remain valid and that enhanced 
implementation efforts are needed. It calls for sustained efforts to find a lasting solution and 
emphasizes that a political solution will only be sustainable in the country. The visible 
importance of the Sahel Strategy in its communications underlines that the EU supports long-
term objectives and is willing to continue support to achieve those. The EU policies therefore 
align with short- and long-term objectives. The Sahel Strategy is a long-term strategy and the 
EU declared it is committed to pursue the achievement of these objectives.   
 Logically, the EU immediately addressed short-term objectives as response to the 
crisis. It also has the Sahel strategy that is focused on longer-term objectives. According to the 
statements the EU is clear about its commitment to long-term objectives and that it will 
continue its efforts to achieve those. Although, it is struggling to turn its efforts into long-term 
objectives it is clearly respecting the principle of the combination of short- and long-term 
objectives.  
5.7. Sub-conclusion 
After scrutinizing EU documents it can be concluded that within EU policies for Mali the 
principles underpinning the CA are fully taken into account. The EU shows it decided to 
incorporate the principles in its strategy. It uses multiple tools, which indicate a 
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multidimensional approach. It also strives for a coherent use of its tools through participation 
in platforms, the establishment of the Sahel Strategy and regular calls to link its policies in its 
statements. The Union believes that to tackle the conflict cooperation should take place in a 
multilateral framework. In the case of Mali the EU did not manage to focus on the entire 
cycle of conflict, but learned from this mistake and is willing to stay engaged in the next 
phases for a sustainable solution. The nexus between security and development is clearly 
visible in its policies. It also strives to combine short- and long-term objectives in its strategy. 
Though, it is noticeable that the EU did not focus on conflict prevention and is struggling to 
combine short- and long-term objectives in practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S1453858 
	  
56	  
6. Conclusion  
This thesis has examined whether the EU managed the conflict in Mali with an effective CA. 
The condition for the EU to exercise a CA is that the strategy towards Mali should comply 
with certain principles. These principles underpin the general concept of EU’s CA. To 
analyze whether the CA was effective it was studied whether the EU has a collective EU 
strategy for Mali, an whether the policies of this strategy have successful outcomes and are 
being harmonized.  
After an analysis of the EU policies for Mali, the results indicated that they adhere to 
the principles of EU’s CA. The EU demonstrated efforts to comply with the principles of a 
multidimensional approach, coherency, multilateralism, focusing on the entire conflict cycle, 
the nexus between security and development and the combination of short- and long-term 
objectives. These principles are all underpinning EU’s strategy for Mali. Though, it should be 
notified that regarding the focus on the entire conflict cycle and the combination of short- and 
long-term objectives, the EU found it difficult to fully realize those in practice.  
The research also examined whether the EU policy for Mali can be considered as an 
effective CA. Firstly, in order to be effective it should meet the criterion of having a collective 
strategy for Mali. The establishment of Crisis platforms and the inter-service mission enabled 
the EU to establish one collective EU strategy for Mali rapidly when the crisis erupted. The 
Crisis Platforms and the inter-service mission ensured the coming together of various actors in 
the EU-system, a joint understanding of the challenges and a priority setting within the 
strategy. This enabled the Union to establish a collective strategy based on a context analysis.  
The second criterion of an effective comprehensive approach is that its policies should 
have successful outcomes. It was reviewed whether the pillars made positive progresses in 
achieving its goals without being hindered by inadequacies of the Union itself. Concerning 
the political pillar it was concluded that progress remains insufficient. The EU could have 
prevented the lack of good governance by putting more pressure through the means of the 
SBC and political dialogue. The EU managed to provide adequate humanitarian assistance 
and the humanitarian pillar could be observed as successful. The way ECHO is working 
positively affected its goal to reach many vulnerable people to address their humanitarian 
needs. Regarding the security pillar the analysis demonstrated some shortcomings, which 
could have been prevented by the Union itself. No sufficient progress is made to achieve the 
goal of a capable Malian army. The initial short-term focus of the EU within the security 
pillar also hampered the progress of achieving its goals under the EUTM. Within the 
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development pillar the EU neither managed to get the degree of progress it could have 
reached. It should have addressed the well spending of its development aid better. Thus, an 
evaluation of progresses made within each pillar demonstrated that in the end the EU could 
have reached better results out of its policies than it has done so far. The outcomes of the 
analysis do not indicate that the EU did not obtain positive results, but the EU could have 
booked more successes in the pillars of politics, development and security when inadequacies 
were prevented. 
That the pillars of the strategy for Mali should be harmonized is the third criterion for 
an effective comprehensive approach. Noticeable is that the EU immediate adopted an 
approach whereby all pillars were working in synergy. It became evident that the EU adopted 
a political approach, meaning that political transformation was the highest priority and other 
pillars contributed to achieve this goal. This was especially the case when the EU gave a clear 
sign from the political side through its statements complemented by stopping development 
cooperation regarding the development pillar. Humanitarian assistance was balancing, as the 
government was not able to provide basic needs to its population. The security pillars 
interacted, because stabilization would positively affect development and political goals within 
the country. The first response package of the EU ensured that the pillars were working in 
synergy.            
 An analysis of each pillar fitting into the overall EU strategy demonstrated that 
regularly its policies are working for the same purpose. Connections exist between policies. 
Particularly the development pillar has overlaps with the other pillars of the strategy. For 
instance, the development and humanitarian sectors cooperate to address the humanitarian 
needs, and developments funds stimulate political reform. Additionally, within the CSDP 
missions, courses on humanitarian principles are included; advice is given on political reforms 
focusing on the security sector; and it is aimed to create the conditions for development. 
ECHO is complementary to the EU strategy by operating when it was needed the most, 
when other pillars could not continue to function entirely. Also the SBC is an example 
whereby development and political actors have an overall goal of promoting political 
transformation.  
However, the results demonstrate that there is no full harmonization of policies. In the 
first response to the crisis the EU did not perform a fully-harmonized strategy because the 
findings indicated that in the initial phase there were deficits in coordination and coherence 
that prevented the pillars working fully on cross-sectorial purposes. More shortcomings were 
found that prevented the pillars positively affecting each other. This is the case with the 
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security pillar, especially the EUTM, that remains functioning compartmentalized and does 
not have the bigger strategy in mind in order to achieve one overall goal. It did not work 
jointly on political and humanitarian goals, because their principles are not being reconciled. 
In contrast, EUCAP Sahel Mali corresponds more with the overall strategy of the EU. 
Moreover the degree of integration between the development and political pillar within he 
SBC remains insufficient, since the aim of achieving political transformation was not met 
properly. The development pillar could have had more impact on the political process. A 
more integrated approach could have accelerated political progress, which eventually would 
have an impact on the objectives of the other pillars of the EU strategy. Thus, a total 
integration of policies is not yet completed. The main concern is that the process of political 
transition remained compartmentalized, which negatively affected other goals of the EU 
pillars. 
Having examined the principles of EU’s CA; the collective EU strategy for Mali; the 
successes of each pillar of the strategy; and the degree of harmonization, the research question 
‘Does the European Union manage the Malian conflict with an effective comprehensive approach?’ can be 
answered. The EU managed the conflict in Mali with a comprehensive approach, but this 
was not entirely effective. Thus, the answer on the question is no. We could not speak of an 
effective integrated approach. It should be emphasized that it was positive that EU processes 
ensured a collective strategy for Mali and that the principles of a CA are being reconciled in 
the strategy. This positively impacted the chances of implementing a comprehensive 
approach effectively. However, the successes of each pillar were not optimal, neither was the 
harmonization of policies in the field.   
 
Epilogue 
 
While writing the conclusion of the thesis the incident on the 21st of January 2015 confirms 
again that the EU and its member states do not operationalize an effective CA. The Dutch 
units under MINUSMA attacked the Tuareg rebels, what could be perceived as a military 
success. However, this endangered the progress of reconciliation on the political side. Thus, 
there is certainly work to be done to increase the effectiveness of the CA.    
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Recommendations  
 
The EU already developed an early warning system. Nevertheless, the EU did not foresee the 
conflict in Mali. Therefore it is recommended that the EU invests more in an early warning 
system. This would enable the Union to be more active in establishing a comprehensive 
strategy in advance. In the end this would enhance EU’s role as security actor. 
Furthermore, in Mali the political progress is extremely slow. The government has a 
certain attitude that indicates the government’s unwillingness to find a political solution or to 
act in accordance to the political reforms necessary. Therefore it is recommended to find 
better ways to make clear that a government in a fragile state needs to respond to its 
commitments. As the biggest donor of Mali the EU could place more political weight to 
ensure the government is bearing its responsibilities. When the EU puts a lot of political 
pressure it risks that the process of transformation in Mali stops, which negatively affects EU’s 
own interests of eliminating terrorism. Hence, I recommend further research on how the EU 
could have bigger impact on a government who is lacking the will for political transition.  
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Annex I – Council Conclusions on Mali 
Council conclusions on Mali148 
3217th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting  
Brussels, 17 January 2013 
 
The Council adopted the following conclusions: 
1. "The EU condemns the acts being carried out by terrorist groups against 
the Malian Armed Forces, which are jeopardising the country's territorial 
integrity and the safety of its population. Under those circumstances, and 
in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions (in particular, Resolutions 2071 and 2085), the EU supports 
the efforts being made by the region and by the international community. 
It welcomes the swift response by France, supported by other EU 
Member States, to the request for military assistance to combat the 
terrorist groups issued by the President of Mali. 
2. The EU supports the rapid deployment of the African-led International 
Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in accordance with UNSC 
Resolution 2085, and reiterates its commitment to providing swift 
financial assistance to that Mission, in particular through the mobilisation 
of the African Peace Facility. The Council invites the High 
Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) to hasten preparations for the 
provision of financial and logistical support, in close cooperation with the 
African Union (AU) and ECOWAS, so that operational proposals can be 
submitted to the Council as a matter of urgency. The Council calls for the 
organisation of a donors' conference as soon as possible to provide 
logistical and financial support for AFISMA's deployment, as required by 
UNSC Resolution 2085. It invites the HR/VP to define the modalities for 
the EU's participation in that conference.  
3. The Council hereby decides to establish the European Union Training 
Mission (EUTM Mali), which will be responsible for providing the 
Malian Armed Forces with military training and advice within the 
framework of Resolutions 2071 and 2085 and in response to the direct 
request by the Malian authorities to the EU. It also hereby decides to 
appoint General François Lecointre as the Mission Commander. It invites 
the Mission Commander to speed up the plans and preparations so that 
the EUTM can be launched by mid-February at the latest; to that end, it 
invites him to send the first technical team to Bamako within the next few 
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  European Council, ‘Council Conclusion on Mali’, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134756.pdf, consulted on 1 October 2014.	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days.  
4. Political progress is essential in order to ensure Mali's long-term stability. 
To that end, the EU urges the Malian authorities to adopt and implement 
a roadmap for the restoration of democracy and constitutional order in 
Mali as soon as possible. It encourages a national inclusive dialogue open 
to the northern populations and to all groups which reject terrorism and 
recognise the country's territorial integrity. In that context, the Council 
reiterates its willingness to gradually resume its development cooperation 
and invites the European Commission to prepare the relevant decisions so 
that the development funds can be rapidly disbursed as soon as the 
conditions are met. It also invites the HR/VP to explore the possibilities 
of rapid assistance through the stability instrument.  
5. The EU reiterates the importance it attaches to close coordination with 
Malian efforts and the other regional and international partners, in 
particular within the framework of the Support and Follow-Up Group 
established by the AU. The Council also welcomes the High 
Representative's plans to hold a meeting of that Group in the near future. 
It also welcomes the plans to hold the ECOWAS meeting in Abidjan on 
19 January and the  AU Summit on 25-26 January.  
6. The EU is prepared to step up its support immediately for the efforts 
being made by humanitarian organisations to assist people in need in 
Mali and its neighbouring countries. It underlines the importance of 
effective coordination between humanitarian actors under the auspices of 
the United Nations, and reiterates its appeal to all the parties concerned to 
allow unhindered humanitarian access to people in need and to ensure the 
safety of aid workers.  
7. The EU calls on all the parties to guarantee the protection of civilian 
populations and to comply with international humanitarian law and 
human rights. All the parties and individuals involved in Mali will be 
held responsible for their actions.  
8. The EU underlines the importance of maintaining stability in the Sahel 
and ensuring that there are no negative repercussions for neighbouring 
countries. It therefore reiterates its commitment to supporting Mali's 
neighbouring states within the framework of its Strategy for the Sahel in 
order to strengthen their security and development. The Council calls on 
the High Representative to present a Council decision immediately so that 
an EU Special Representative for the Sahel can be rapidly appointed." 
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Annex II - Interview Guide 
European Union, European External Action Service, Brussels, Belgium 
Thesis International Relations – European Union Studies 
University Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands 
• 16th of January 2015 
• Mr. Soret, EU Delegation Mali - head Mali/Sahel team EEAS 
Main question of the research:  
Does the European Union manage the Malian conflict with an effective 
comprehensive approach?’ 
• The interviewer: Malou Snijders, student at the University Leiden, Leiden. Master 
thesis research for the Master ‘International Relations – European Union Studies’.  
• The topics of the interview will be: the comprehensive approach of the European 
Union in Mali. 
• Interview will last approximately 1 hour and will be recorded to handle what is said 
carefully.  
• It will only be used for my research and will be completely confidential.  
• Note: the notes between the questions are theories and definitions from the literature 
review of the research; these can be explained more extensive during the interview by 
the interviewer 
 
Section 1: Introduction  
1. What is your function within the European External Action Service? And since when 
do you hold this position? 
 
2. Are you familiar with the concept of a comprehensive approach?  
 
[Note: a comprehensive approach rests on the following principles: a multidimensional approach, coherence, 
support for multilateralism, a focus on the entire conflict cycle, the nexus between security and development and 
the combination of short-term and long-term objectives. In case it is used effectively there should be one overall 
EU strategy, policies should be harmonized and progress should be made on the objectives of the strategy.] 
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Section 2: Main questions   
3. Does the European Union have an effective comprehensive approach in dealing with 
the conflict in Mali?  
 
4. The EU did not foresee the conflict in Mali. Does the EU need to invest more in 
preventing conflict? 
5. Could you mention some examples of cross-sectors collaboration in the case of Mali?  
 
6. What kind of improvements could be done to fully harmonize/integrate all pillars of 
the EU strategy towards Mali? 
 
7. ECHO is working according the humanitarian principles: humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence. Do you think this hindered an effective 
comprehensive approach in Mali? 
 
8. A key theme in the Sahel Strategy is the connection between security and 
development. How do EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali relate to the Sahel 
Strategy?  
 
9. How do EUTM and EU CAP Sahel Mali relate to the political goals in the country?  
10. Are there progresses made in the political transformation process since the initiation 
of the crisis in March 2012? Do you think it proceeds as scheduled/planned?  
 
11. How is the EU working to achieve a sustainable solution? Specifically, if you look at 
the short-term and long term development objectives of the EU’s strategy.  
 
Section 3: Evaluation and prospects 
12. If you look back, do you think the EU could have done things differently?  
 
13. What do you think are the future prospects of EU’s engagement in Mali? 
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